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ARTICLES
THE MONTANA DEATH TAXES*
By Douglas Jerome Wold * *
• This article is a condensed version of the author's thesis prepared
under the auspices of The National Law Center of the George
Washington University.
•* L.L.B. 1965, University of Montana; L.L.M. (Taxation) 1969, The
George Washington University; Member of the Montana Bar.
A BRIEF OUTLINE OF THE MONTANA DEATH TAXES
A. Inheritance Tax
Montana enacted its first death tax in 1897, eight years after achieving
statehood. It was an inheritance tax modeled after the New York law
of 1885 and the California law of 1893.1 The 1897 law provided a familial
exemption of $7,500; any excess was taxable at one percent. The tax on
nonfamilial inheritances was five percent on amounts over $500. Future
interests were valued immediately after death and were immediately
taxable. Taxes were due at death with ten percent penalty if not paid
within ten months; but a three percent discount was allowed if paid
within six months of death.
No significant changes 2 were made in the 1897 law until 1921,3 when
a completely different structure was adopted, modeled after the then
extant Wisconsin law. The 1921 act established progressive tax rates.
Widows were given exemptions of $10,000; lineals were allowed only
$2,000; transfers to charitable institutions were entirely exempt from
tax. Absent a showing of adequate consideration, a transfer made within
two years of death was presumed to have been made in contemplation of
death and thus taxable. Holders of general powers of appointment were
treated as absolute owners of all property subject to their power. The
death of a joint tenant was deemed a taxable transfer of one-half of
the property to the surviving tenant.
Due to a legislative oversight, the 1921 act failed to tax transfers
to lineals in excess of $25,000. Consequently, in 1923 the entire 1921 act
was repealed and a new act was passed superseding all inheritance tax
laws previously enacted. 4 Inter alia, the 1923 act increased the widow's
exemption to $17,500; a husband's right to a $5,000 exemption was re-
cognized; the exemption for lineals remained at $2,000. Transfers ex-
ceeding the exemptions and up to $25,000 were taxed at one percent. This
was known as the primary rate. The primary rate for brothers and
'Laws of Montana, 1897, No. 128, p. 83.
'In 1905 the act of 1897 was amended to authorize the county attorney to prosecute
proceedings to collect unpaid taxes. Laws of 1905, Ch. 46, p. 94. In 1917, certain
sections were amended which related to the payment of the tax to the County Treas-
urers. Laws of 1917, Ch. 40, p. 42.
'Laws of Montana, 1921, Extra-ordinary Session, Ch. 14, p. 772.
'Laws of Montana, 1923, Ch. 65, p. 140. While this act expressly repealed the 1921
inheritance tax law, it contained a savings clause as to the liability for taxes accrued
under the old law and as to the right to collect and institute actions for such taxes.
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sisters and their descendants was two percent up to $25,000, with a $500
exemption; transfers to uncles, aunts and first cousins were subject to
a three percent primary rate; transfers to other collaterals or non-rela-
tives were taxable at four percent. Regardless of class, transfers which
exceeded $25,000 but were less than $50,000 were taxed at twice that
classes' primary rate; from $50,000 to $100,000 at three times the primary
rate; transfers over $100,000 were taxed at four times the primary rate.
A resident's tangible personalty located outside the state was not
subject to tax, provided it was taxable by the state in which it was
located. The time within which payment could be made at a discount was
extended from six to eighteen months. Clear market value 5 was set as the
standard for valuation.
The 1923 act is the basis for the present law. Important amendments
since that time include a doubling of all primary rates in 1933, 6 an exten-
sion of the presumptive period to three years with regard to transfers
in contemplation of death,7 an enactment of a provision permitting re-
ciprocal taxation of intangible personalty of a non-resident decedent,8
and an increase of both the widow's and husband's exemption to $20,000. 9
In 1947, the inheritance tax laws were incorporated in the Revised Codes
of Montana, 1947, as Chapter 44 of Title 91. Since that time, the basic
tax scheme has remained substantially as originally enacted in 1923.10
Subject to certain exceptions and qualifications, the tax is imposed
when the recipient becomes beneficially entitled in possession or ex-
pectancy.1 ' It is imposed upon any transfer by succession or will, or by
means of certain statutory substitutions for wills. 1 2  The tax rate is
applied against the clear market value of the transferred property as of
the time of death after allowance for certain statutory deductions and
exemptions. 13 Liability for payment of the tax falls upon the beneficiary,
but both the executor or administrator and the beneficiary are personally
liable for payment. 1 4 To insure payment, the property transferred is
subject to a ten-year lien. 15
5 Neither the Montana Legislature nor the Montana Supreme Court has defined the
term "clear market value." Absent such definition, the term is probably synonymous
with 'fair market value" as utilized by the federal estate tax and which is defined
as:
The fair market value is the price at which the property would change
hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under
any compulsion to buy or sell and both having reasonable knowledge of
relevant facts. Int. Rev. Regs., Section 20.2031-1(6)
'Laws of Montana, 1933, Special Session, Ch. 48.7Laws of Montana, 1935, Ch. 47.
'Laws of Montana, 1945, Ch. 3.
'Laws of Montana, 1965, Ch. 244; Laws of Montana, 1969, Ch ......
"For a detailed discussion of post-1947 amendments, see 2 CCH, Inheritance, Estate
and Gift Service (7th ed.), paras. 1034A-1044.
nR.C.M.1947, sec. 91-4403.
"R.C.M.1947, sec. 91-4401. The statute specifies five such substitutes. They are
transfers in contemplation of death, transfers to take effect in possession or enjoy-
ment at or after death, powers of appointment, joint tenancies, and insurance.
"R.C.M.1947, sees. 91-4407, -4413, -4414.
"R.C.M.1947, see. 91-4415.
15Ibid,
[Vol. 31
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B. Estate Tax
Montana is one of thirty-seven states having both an estate and an
inheritance tax.1 6 Montana's first estate tax was enacted in 1927 and
was a progressive tax on estates having a net or clear market value in
excess of $1,000,000.17 This act also provided for a credit against the
estate tax equal to any amount of federal estate tax due.
The 1927 law was amended in 1933.18 No changes in the 1933 law
have been made since its enactment and it is codified in the Revised
Codes of Montana, 1947, as section 91-4411. The law applies only to
resident decedent's estates which exceed $100,000, and is designed to
absorb the eighty percent credit allowed the taxpayer by the 1926 United
States Revenue Act for state taxes paid. The tax is due at the same time
the federal estate tax is payable. A lien is imposed on the property
subject to the tax, and it continues until the tax is paid.
TRANSFERS SUBJECT TO TAX
A. Generally
Transfers by will and by intestacy laws are apparently the oldest
and most common categories of taxable transfers. Other types of transfers
became more common only when it was found that the tax could be
legitimately avoided by making transfers inter vivos rather than at death.
Accordingly, in order to make the death tax function, legislatures found
it necessary to levy taxes against those forms of inter vivos transfers
which were being used to avoid the death taxes. Today, nearly every
type of property devolution has been brought within the scope of death
taxation.
The Montana death tax statutes reach six major categories of trans-
fers:
1. Transfers by will or intestacy. 19
2. Transfers in contemplation of death.20
3. Transfers to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after
death.21
4. Powers of appointment.
22
5. Joint interests. 23
6. Insurance.24
Although each of these categories have distinct characteristics, there are
some general rules applicable to all. For example, there can be no tax
"Supra, note 3.
17Laws of Montana, 1927, Ch. 141, sec. 1, subd. 4.
"Laws of Montana, 1933, Ch. 48, see. 3.
"R.C.M.1947, Sec. 91-4401.
R.C.M.1947, Sec. 91-4402.
1R.C.M.1947, Sec. 91-4402.
1R.C.M.1947, Sec. 91-4404.
1R.C.M.1947, Sec. 91-4405.
'R.C.M.1947, Sec. 91-4406.
1.970]
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unless there has first been a "transfer. "25 It must be remembered, how-
ever, that an inheritance tax is imposed upon the privilege of receiving
property. Obviously, a beneficiary cannot receive something he already
owns; likewise, a decedent cannot transfer something he does not own.
26
Section 91-4453, R.C.M. 1947, defines a "transfer" as:
... the passing of property or any interest therein, in possession
or enjoyment, present or future, by inheritance, descent, devise, suc-
cession, bequest, grant, deed, bargain, sale, gift or appointment.
Only transfers of beneficial interests are taxable; receipt of a mere
legal title in trust is not a transfer subject to tax.27 When determining
whether there has been a taxable transfer, the substance of the trans-
action should control.
28
B. Transfers by Will and Intestacy
The Montana inheritance tax statutes do not define what is meant
by a "transfer by will or by intestate laws. "29 Transfers made by codicil
are taxable as being a transfer by will, since the law provides that the
term "will" includes codicils. 30 There is little difficulty in determining
whether a transfer has been made when property passes either by will or
by intestacy. Normally the will itself establishes the details of the trans-
fer or the intestate laws will establish the manner and order of property
devolution.
Frequently, a testator will direct his executor "to pay all my just
debts and expenses." While this technically amounts to a bequest in
favor of the testator's creditors, such transfers are deductible and, con-
sequently, are not subject to taxation. 31 However, such transfers should
not be confused with bequests made as consideration pursuant to a
contract. For example, A might promise to leave his house to B if B
will care for A during his waning years. There is neither Montana
statutory authority nor case law directly on this point, but the weight of
authority favors taxing such transfers3 2 and the Montana Supreme Court
has recognized this fact in dicta.33
2R.C.M.1947, See. 91-4401.
1in In re Mayer's Estate, 110 Mont. 66, 99 P.2d 209 (1940), the husband purchased
certain property with his own funds but recorded the title in his wife's name with
the clear understanding that she would convey the property to him at his request.
She conveyed the property to her husband one year before her death. The court
found there was no transfer in contemplation of death, inasmuch as the wife merely
held the legal title in trust and had no beneficial interest in the property at any time.
Also see R.C.M. 91-4405 which provides for the taxation of transfers of all property
held in joint tenancy, "except such part thereof as may be shown to have originally
belonged to the survivor and never to have belonged to the decedent." C.f., Estate
of Parks, 145 Mont. 33, 401 P.2d 83 (1965).
2"In re Mayer's Estate, supra, note 26. Also see Gleason and Otis, "Inheritance
Taxes" (4th ed.), 544; and In re Peterson's Estate, 182 Wash. 29, 45 P.2d 45 (1935).
2St. Bd. of Equalization v. Cole, 122 Mont. 9, 19, 195 P.2d 989 (1948).
nR.C.M.1947, Sec. 91-4401.
OR.C.M.1947, Sec. 19-103(6).
nR.C.M.1947, Sec. 91-4407.
3See 85 C.J.S., Taxation, See. 114(6), p. 906.8SIn re Mayer's Estate, 110 Mont. 66, 70, 99 P.2d 209 (1940).
[Vol. 31
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A bequest to an executor or a trustee in lieu of his commission is
taxable only to the extent it exceeds the amount of the commission as
determined by law.34 However, if the transfer was to the executor to be
distributed as part of the estate, or to the trustee to be held in trust
for eventual distribution, neither transfer would be of a beneficial in-
terest and, consequently, would not be subject to tax until received by
the ultimate beneficiary.35
There is no reported Montana case dealing with the taxability of
renounced legacies. In this connection, section 91-4401 appears to tax
only completed transfers. Other jurisdictions have held that no tax can
be imposed on the legatee who renounces his inheritance since the tax is
imposed only on those who actually receive property.36 However, a renun-
ciation or disclaimer of an inheritance should not be confused with the
release of an interest which has vested. For example, if a legatee should
transfer his legacy to a specific person or category or persons, he should
be deemed to have accepted the legacy and then to have disposed of it
by gift. In this regard, distinction has been drawn between a disclaimer
of a transfer by will and a disclaimer of an interest in an intestate
estate. In Hardenbergh v. Commissioner 7 a taxpayer disclaimed his intes-
tate share and it was held that he had made a taxable transfer under
the federal gift tax because under the local law an interest vested in
him despite the disclaimer. It should be noted that that case turned on
the local law's provision that intestate shares vested as a matter of law
and could not be disclaimed. Montana has no such law. However, Cali-
fornia provides that renunciations are to be disregarded, and the in-
heritance tax is to be computed as if the renunciation had not been made-
section 13409 of its inheritance tax law.
C. Transfers in Contemplation of Death
An obvious way to avoid an inheritance tax would be to dispose of
the property by gift just before death. To thwart this simple method of
tax avoidence, the Montana Legislature has enacted section 91-4402, R.C.M.
1947, which expressly applies the inheritance tax to every transfer in
contemplation of death. Section 91-4402 sets outs a combination of
elements which together raise a presumption that the transfer was made
in contemplation of death. These elements are:
1. that there was a transfer,
2. that the transfer was made within three years of death,
3. that the property transferred was a "material part" of the de-
cedent's estate,
"R.C.M.1947, See. 91-4420.
-R.C.M.1947, See. 91-4403.
"Est. of T. J. Stone, 132 Iowa 136, 109 N.W. 455 (1906); Bouse v. Hull, 168 Md. 1,
176 Atl. 645 (1935); Est. of E. D. Bute, 355 Pa. 170, 49 A.2d 339 (1946).
"198 F.2d 63 (8th Cir., 1952), cert. den., 344 U.S. 836 (1952).
1970]
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4. that the transfer was in the nature of a final distribution of the
property, and
5. that the transfer was made for less than "fair consideration in
money or money's worth."
However, the presumption is rebuttable and no transfer made more than
three years before death will be subject to such presumption. Each of
the foregoing elements warrants discussion.
(1) "Transfer" required.
If there has been no transfer, there cannot have been a transfer
in contemplation of death. Section 91-4402, R.C.M. 1947, expressly
recognizes certain types of transfers by deed, grant, bargain, sale or
gift. A problem arises, however, as to whether other types of transactions
qualify as transfers. For example, it has been held under statutes similar
to section 91-4402 that a transfer of community property into a tenancy
in common was not a transfer in contemplation of death ;38 a disclaimer
of a bequest under a will has been held not to be a transfer, even though
it was obviously made in contemplation of death.3 9 In Montana, a wife's
conveyance of legal title in real estate to her husband was held not to
be a taxable transfer. 40 The court found that the type of transfer con-
templated by the statute was one of a beneficial, rather than a legal
interest.
Transfers in contemplation of death frequently take the form of
an inter vivos gift. To be regarded as a completed gift, the transaction
must satisfy three requirements, i.e., delivery, accompanying intent, and
acceptance by the donee.41 These three elements were found to be present
in State Board of Equalization v. Cole.42 There, a widow's transfer of
her funds from a single name account to a joint account amounted to a
transfer subject to taxation.
In In re Brown's Estate,43 the Montana Supreme Court considered
whether the transfer, which was made within the presumptive period,
was an inter vivos transfer and, thus, free from any Montana tax, or
whether it was a testamentary transfer and subject to the inheritance
tax. In that case, a daughter had purchased certain bonds with the de-
cedent's money which were payable either to the decedent or to the
daughter. The bonds were placed in a safe deposit box to which both
had access. It was held that there was no inter vivos transfer because there
8Rickenberg v. Comm'r., 177 F.2d 114 (9th Cir., 1949), cert. den., 338 U.S. 949 (1950).
'Brown v. Routzahn, 63 F.2d 914 (6th Cir., 1933), cert. den., 290 U.S. 641 (1933).
Cf., Rev. Rul. 54-19, 1954-1 C.B. 179.
4OIn re Mayer's Estate, 110 Mont. 66, 99 P.2d 209 (1940); Cf., In re Kohr's Estate,
122 Mont. 145, 199 P.2d 856 (1948) where it was held that the significant element
in possession or enjoyment is the passing of economic benefits, rather than shifting
of technical legal title.
"St. Bd. of Equalization v. Cole, 122 Mont. 9, 195 P.2d 989 (1948).
4AId.
41122 Mont. 451, 206 P.2d 816 (1949).
[Vol. 31
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was no completed delivery to the daughter, not even a constructive de-
livery, inasmuch as the mother had not relinquished all control over the
bonds.
(2) Transfers made within three years of death.
In 1935, the Montana Legislature increased the presumptive period
from two to three years.44 The purpose for articulating a time certain
appears arbitary, but is probably necessitated by the need to simplify
administration of the tax. It should be noted that the presumptive period
under federal estate tax is also three years.45
It must be remembered that this element only provides the state
with a rebuttable presumption. The 1926 federal estate tax created a
conclusive presumption that transfers in excess of $5,000 made within
two years of death were in contemplation of death. 46 This conclusive pre-
sumption was held to be unconstitutional as a violation of the Fifth
Amendment.
47
(3) "Material Part" of decedent's estate.
Section 91-4402, R.C.M. 1947, taxes only transfers of a "material
part" of the decedent's estate. It does not define what is meant by the
phrase "material part" nor has the phrase been interpreted by the Mon-
tana Supreme Court.48  However, the Court has found that gifts of
$117,53249 and $8,34750 were made in contemplation of death and has,
thus, impliedly decided that those gifts were a material part of the estate.
Unfortunately, the size of the gross estate was not indicated in these
opinions so a percentage figure cannot be computed.
The federal estate tax provision taxing transfers in contemplation of
death5 ' does not require that the transferred property amount to a
material part of the estate. Consequently, Montana practitioners can
seek no guidance from interpretations of the federal law. The majority
of those jurisdictions which have interpreted this phrase have utilized
the theory that whether a gift amounts to a material part of an estate is
a question of fact to be decided in regard to the facts of each case, and
that even though the value of the property transferred may be small
4Laws of Montana, 1935, ch. 47.
'Int. Rev. Code, 1954, Sec. 2035.
41U.S. Rev. Act of 1926, See. 302(c), 44 Stat. 70.
Hmeiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1932). It has been suggested, however, that the
U.S. Supreme Court might now sustain a conclusive presumption that transfers within
a prescribed period were in contemplation of death. See Lowndes, "Current Consti-
tutional Problems in Federal Taxation," 4 Vand. L. Rev., 469, at 488-490 (1951).
"In re Brown's Estate, 122 Mont. 451, 206 P.2d 816 (1949). The court here noted
that a gift had been made of bonds having a maturity value of over $57,000. The
decedent's gross estate was valued at over $555,000. The court noted that the estate
had argued that the bonds were not a material part of the estate, but held that that
question need not be decided since other reasons required a holding that the gift was
not in contemplation of death.
"In re Wadsworth 's Estate, 92 Mont. 135, 11 P.2d 788 (1932).0St. Bd. of Equalization v. Cole, supra, note 41.
'Int. Rev. Code, 1954, Sec. 2035.
1970]
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compared to the total value of the estate, it may still be a material part
by reason of its substantial value. For example, a Kentucky Court 52
held that the term "material" was a relative one, meaning "of solid
or weighty character," " substantial," "of consequence " or "important. ',15
In that case, the court held that a gift valued at $30,000 was a material
part of a net estate amounting to over $600,000. Other courts have ruled
that gifts were material which amounted to 10% of the net estate,54 or
which were $10,000 out of a net estate of $332,000.' 5 Gifts held im-
material include occasional gifts of $500 to $1,000 made by a donor pos-
sessing a net estate in excess of $300,000,56 and also a gift of one-sixth
of a net estate.
57
Because Montana's inheritance tax laws have been adopted from the
laws of Wisconsin, it is interesting to note that the courts of that state
have said that while the size of the estate is a material factor in deter-
mining the materiality of the gift, the actual size of the gift in each
instance is to a large extent controlling, and that a gift of great value
is a material part of any estate, regardless of size, because it is a material
matter or matter of substance. 58
(4) ". . . final disposition or distribution of the decedent's estate ..
This element requires an examination of the donor's motive or
intent in making the transfer. The clearest example of a gift made in
contemplation of death is a gift causa mortis, i.e., a gift motivated by
the donor's concern over his imminent death, but which is revocable if
he survives. However, the United States Supreme Court, in United States
v. Wells 59 held that for federal estate tax purposes, inter vivos gifts
may be made in contemplation of death, despite the fact that they may be
fully executed, irrevocable, and indefeasible. 60 The Montana Supreme
Court has indicated its willingness to apply the rationale of United
States v. Wells in interpreting the contemplation of death provision of
the Montana inheritance tax. In In re Wadsworth's Estate,61 the Court
set out the controlling interpretation of the Montana statute, and cited
extensively from Wells, as follows:
The dominant purpose is to reach substitutes for testamentary dis-
positions and thus to prevent the evasion of the estate tax .... As the
transfer may otherwise have all the indicia of a valid gift inter vivos,
the differentiating factor must be found in the transferor's motive.
Death must be 'contemplated,' that is the motive which induces the
52Chases' Executrix v. Commonwealth, 284 Ky. 471, 145 S.W.2d 58 (1940).
"Ibid., 145 S.W.2d at 61.
mDupignac's Estate, 96 N.J.Eq. 284, 125 A.119 (1924).
61n re Ebeling's Estate, 169 Wis. 432, 172 N.W. 734 (1919).
BOId.
wIn re Gould's Estate, 8 N.J. Misc. 798, 151 A. 743 (1930), affm'd, 148 A. 731 (1930)
and 154 A. 632 (1931).
"In re Steven's Will, 177 Wis. 500, 188 N.W. 484 (1922); In re Stephenson's Est.,
171 Wis. 452, 177 N.W. 579 (1920).
mU.S. v. Wells, 283 U.S. 102 (1931).
®The Montana Supreme Court has come to the same conclusion. See In re Wadsworth 's
Estate, 92 Mont. 135, 148, 11 P.2d 788 (1932).
a192 Mont. 135, 11 P.2d 788 (1932).
[Vol. 31
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transfer must be of the sort which leads to testamentary disposition.
S.. As the test, despite varying circumstances, is always to be found
in motive, it cannot be said that the determinative motive is lacking
merely because of the absence of a consciousness that death is im-
minent. It is contemplation of death, not necessarily contemplation
of imminent death, to which the statute refers. It is conceivable
that the idea of death may possess the mind so as to furnish a con-
trolling motive for the disposition of property, although death is not
thought to be close at hand. . . . The words in "contemplation of
death" mean that the thought of death is the impelling cause of the
transfer ...62
In the Wadsworth case, the decedent had transferred property in
trust to his wife and children. He named himself as a trustee. At the
time of the transfer, he was sixty years of age and had been a semi-
invalid for several years. The disposition under the trust was substantial-
ly similar to that made under his will, except that under the trust he
retained control of the trust property for life, as well as the income there-
from. The settlor died within two years of creating the trust. In finding
that the gift was made in contemplation of death, the Court set forth its
own version of the Wells criteria, i.e., that the possibility of death had
subordinated the normal desire to retain ownership and control; the gift
was not the result of "normal generosity," but instead was "motivated
by the same consideration which lead to testamentary dispositions, and
is made as substitute for them."63
The tests for whether a transfer has been made "in contemplation
of death" are more easily articulated than applied. Their application
requires a subjective determination of whether the transfer was prompted
by a "life" or a "death" motive. Consider, for example, the man on his
deathbed who makes lavish gifts to those about him in an attempt to
induce them to make his final hours as pleasant as possible. Was the
"impelling cause" for the gifts the thought of his death, or was it the
"life motive" of insuring creature comforts while he could still enjoy
them? Certainly these gifts are not the result of "normal generosity,"
but on the other hand, they may not be motivated for the same reasons
which lead to testamentary dispositions. This example illustrates that
the ultimate test of the transfer is not its objective operation, but is the
subjective state of mind of the transferror which must be tested by sub-
jective standards.
Application of subjective standards necessarily requires an investi-
gation into the history of the gift. As the court noted in In re Wads-
worth's Estate:
The best evidence of the decedent's state of mind at the time and
his reasons for making the transfers are the statements and ex-
pressions of the decedent himself, supported as such statements
are by all the circumstances connected with the transfer as well as
the transfers themselves.64
'92 Mont. at 145, 146.
392 Mont. at 149.
"'92 Mont. at 148.
19701
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Thus, in In re Warren's Estate,6 5 the court gave considerable weight to
the recollections of the decedent's accountant and lawyer who had super-
vised the transfer of property. Each recalled that the decedent had
known that he was ill at the time of the transfer, but that their impres-
sions of his dominant motive for making the transfer was to save income
taxes and also to simplify his business operations. Accordingly, said the
court, the evidence was ample to support the conclusion that the gifts were
not made in contemplation of death, but instead were made for purposes
associated with life.
In State v. Rice,66 a husband believed that he held certain property
in joint tenancy with his wife, but discovered that it had been accidentally
recorded in his name alone. He conveyed the property to himself and his
wife as joint tenants and died within two years. The court held the trans-
fer was not made in contemplation of death, but instead was motivated
by a desire to arrange his affairs in accordance with his prior beliefs.
Cases from other jurisdictions have found transfers to have been
prompted by life, rather than death motives. For example, transfers to
provide immediate financial assistance to a transferee,6 7 or to relieve
the donor from repeated importunities for financial assistance,68 or to
set the donee up in business 69 have been held to have been actuated by
life motives. Gifts to promote family harmony have been held not to
have been made in contemplation of death. 0 A transfer to avoid death
taxes is obviously made in contemplation of death,71 but those made to
avoid income,7 2 gift,73 or property74 taxes have been held to have been
prompted by life motives.
If a transfer is prompted by both life and death motives, the prob-
lem must be resolved by determining which was the dominant or impelling
motive. The final decision may often result from pure speculation, for
in many cases it is doubtful that there was a dominant motive. For this
reason, there seems to be a good argument for the theory that the gift
was made in contemplation of death if the death motive was "substantial"
1128 Mont. 395, 275 P.2d 843 (1954).
m134 Mont. 265, 329 P.2d 451 (1958).
"See e.g., W. B. McGregor v. Comm'r, 82 F.2d 948 (1st Cir., 1936); Hoover v. U.S.,
180 F.Supp. 601 (Ct. Cl., 1960); Metzger v. U.S., 181 F.Supp. 830 (N.D. Ohio, 1960);
Boyd v. U.S., 192 F.Supp. 242 (E.D. Ky., 1961).
"Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co., 17 B.T.A. 910 (1929); Browarsky v. Granger, 148
F.Supp. 665 (W.D. Pa. 1956).
'Herbert G. Lowe, 38 B.T.A. 117 (1938); Commercial Nat'l Bank, 36 B.T.A. 239
(1937).7OTerhune v. Welch, 39 F. Supp. 430 (D. Mass. 1941); Gillette v. Comm'r., 182 F.2d
1010 (9th Cir., 1950).
7Vanderlip v. Comm'r., 155 F.2d 152 (2nd Cir., 1946); Edwin v. Rickenberg, 11 T.C. 1
(1948); Studebaker v. U.S., 195 F. Supp. 841 (N.D. Ind. 1961).
"Becker v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 296 U.S. 48 (1935); Bell v. U.S., 74 F.Supp.
295 (D. Minn. 1947); American Trust v. U.S., 175 F. Supp. 185 (N.D. Cal., 1959).7Anna B. Kneeland, 34 B.T.A. 816 (1936); but see, Rickenberg v. Comm'r., 177
F.2d 114 (9th Cir., 1949), cert. den., 338 U.S. 949 (1950).
7'Robert A. Taft, 33 B.T.A. 671 (1935), affm'd 92 F.2d 667 (6th Cir., 1937), affm'd
304 U.S. 351 (1938).
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rather than "dominant. ''75 However, most cases interpret United States
v. Wells as requiring that the death motive be the dominant one.76
(5) ". . . fair consideration in money or money's worth . . "
A transfer made for "fair consideration in money or money's worth"
is not a transfer in contemplation of death. The theory for taxing a
transfer in contemplation of death is to reach substitutes for testamentary
dispositions and not to penalize sales and exchanges which do not deplete
the transferor's estate.
Thus, in In re Sebree's Estate,77 the Montana Supreme Court held
that the decedent's transfer of a hotel valued at $12,000 in exchange
for a payment of $10,300 plus $150 per month for life was fair and
valuable consideration.
Perhaps the most perplexing problem that may be anticipated under
this section is the meaning of the phrase "in money or money's worth"
as it applies to transfer incident to marriage. Reference to cases decid-
ed under the federal estate tax 78 may provide a guideline for Montana
practitioners. The leading case is Commissioner v. Weymss 79 where a
widow's promise to marry the decedent in return for his paying her an
amount equal to the value of an interest she would forfeit as a result
of the marriage was held not to be consideration in money or money's
worth. The court reasoned that the determinative factor was the con-
sideration received by the donor, i.e., the decedent, which in this case was
the widow's promise, and concluded that regardless of how valuable the
promise was to the decedent, it was not reducible by him to a money
value.
Other examples of considerations which might support a contract,
but which are not considered as money or money's worth are promises
to refrain from marrying until a certain age,80 agreeing not to contest
the decedent's will,8 ' or dismissing a suit against the decedent's wife.82
Under the federal estate tax, a wife's release of dower is expressly
said not to be adequate and full consideration in money or money's
worth.8 3
"Such a theory was advanced by Judge Augustus Hand in Farmer's Loan and Trust
Co. v. Bowers, 98 F.2d 794 (2nd Cir., 1938), cert. den., 306 U.S. 648 (1939).
"
0For example, the U.S. Supreme Court has elaborated on its decision in U.S. V. Wells,
supra, note 59, by stating that not only must the motive be "dominant", it must
be "controlling" or "impelling" as well. Allen v. Trust Co. of Georgia, 326 U.S.
630 (1946). It does not appear that any of these adjectives are any more definitive
than the other.
1122 Mont. 509, 206 P.2d 553 (1949).
"Int. Rev. Code, 1954, Sec. 2043, provides that transfers which are "not a bona fide
sale for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth . .. shall be
included in the gross estate" to the extent of the excess of the value of the property
transferred over the consideration received.
"324 U.S. 303 (1945).
"John Nichols, 40 B.T.A. 1040 (1939), affm'd 177 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1941), cert. den.,
314 U.S. 631 (1941).
'Latty v. Comm'r, 62 F.2d 952 (6th Cir., 1933).
'Angus 0. Swink, P-H para. 45, 169 affm'd 155 F.2d 723 (4th Cir., 1946).
'Int. Rev. Code., 1954, See. 2043(b).
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However, a decedent is usually not penalized when he transfers
property for less than its full value,8 4 provided that the sale or exchange
was bona fide and made in good faith. This interpretation of the federal
estate tax is probably applicable to the Montana inheritance tax, despite
the fact that the former talks in terms of "adequate and full" considera-
tion whereas the latter speaks in terms of "fair" consideration.
Overcoming the Presumption
The practitioner who supervises transfers of property will be well
advised to keep notes of his impressions of the transferor's motives in
making the transfer. It would be even better to collect and preserve
any letters written by the testator in which he may have discussed his
motives. To overcome the presumption that a transfer was made in
contemplation of death, it is necessary to produce evidence to prove that
the transfer was not prompted by a death motive. Montana courts will
give serious consideration to such evidence, as was established in In re
Warren's Estate where the Court's decision that the transfer was not in
contemplation of death rested primarily on the recollections of the trans-
feror's accountant and lawyer. However, it is clear that the ultimate
question is one of fact, and simply because interested parties testify will
not overcome the presumption as a matter of law.8 5 However, it has been
said that the question is no longer one for the triers of fact "where the
facts proved are overwhelmingly against the presumed facts and permit of
but one rational and reasonable conclusion."86
In a case where the transfer is made more than three years prior
to death, the date of the transfer does not overcome the presumption as
a matter of law; instead, the presumption never arises.81
Advantages of making intentional transfers in contemplation of
death
A discussion of the taxability of transfers in contemplation of death
would not be complete without a mention of the possible advantages
that may flow from making such a transfer intentionally. The advantage
is not one resulting from the Montana inheritance tax, however, but
results from the credit allowable under the federal estate tax for gift taxes
paid.8 8
Many persons of advanced age may hesitate to make gifts for fear
of the transfer being taxed as a gift in contemplation of death. Ordinarily,
8Int. Rev. Regs., Sec. 20.2043-1 (a).
5SeC e.g., State v. Keating, 134 Mont. 372, 332 P.2d 906 (1958); Lewis v. Bowman,
113 Mont. 68, 121 P.2d 162 (1942); McLaughlin v. Corcoran, 104 Mont. 590, 69 P.2d
597 (1937).
"State v. Rice, 134 Mont. 265, 272, 329 P.2d 451 (1958), citing Renland v. First
Nat'l Bank, 90 Mont. 424, 4 P.2d 488 (1931).8
'R.C.M.1947, Sec. 91-4402 provides that ". . . but no such transfer .. .made before
such three year period shall be treated as having been made in contemplation of
death . ... "
Int. Rev. Code, 1954, Sec. 2012.
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this is a mistake. If the donor does not die within the three year period,
the contemplation of death provision will not apply and the transfer will
be subjected only to the federal gift tax,8 9 the rates of which are lower
than the estate tax. However, if he should die within the three year
period, his estate is entitled to a double bonus, i.e., a credit under the
Internal Revenue Code, 1954, section 2012, which is equal to the amount
of federal gift tax paid, plus the amount of money used to pay the gift
tax is not includible in his gross estate for federal estate tax purposes.
Even if the gift tax has not been paid at the date of death, an amount
equal to the amount of tax is-deductible from the gross estate.90
D. Transfers to Take Effect at Death
Besides taxing transfers in contemplation of death, section 91-4402,
R.C.M. 1947 also taxes transfers "intended to take effect in possession
or enjoyment at or after . . . death." The statute does not define the
quoted phrase, but the provision is meant to reach those transfers made
by the transferor during his life where he retains a beneficial interest
in the property so that the beneficiary must wait until the transferor 's
death in order to have possession or enjoyment. An example of this type
of transfer is one in which property is conveyed in trust by the trans-
feror for his children but he retains a life interest in the income. The
children's enjoyment of the property is thus delayed until the trans-
feror's death, and the entire transfer takes on the character of a testa-
mentary disposition.
In In re Estate of Schuh,91 a mother transferred property to her
children with the understanding that they would pay her an annuity
during her life. The children put the property in trust and used the
income therefrom to discharge the annuity. The Montana Court telescoped
these two transactions into one and held the transfer taxable on the theory
that the two transfers were actually designed to forestall the children's
enjoyment of the property until the death of the mother.
In re Kohr's Estate92 followed the Schuh case, supra, in establishing
the principle that under section 91-4402, the taxable event is the trans-
fer of the beneficial rather than the legal title. There the decedent
transferred property in trust to her issue, but retained a life estate. The
court said that the vested character of the remainder was immaterial if
the right to immediate possession and enjoyment was deferred until the
grantor's death.
'Montana has no gift tax.
'For a detailed explanation of this advantage of intentionally making transfers in
contemplation of death, see Lowiides and Kramer, "Federal Estate and Gift Taxes,"
See. 513, pp. 75, 76.
'66 Mont. 50, 212 P. 516 (1923).
02122 Mont. 145, 199 P.2d 856 (1948).
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In State Board of Equalization v. Cole,93 the decedent purchased
U. S. Savings Bonds jointly in her name and the name of another, and
placed the bonds in a safe deposit box to which both had access. The
court found that there had been no gift because the delivery was not
complete. Consequently, this was held to be a taxable transfer on the
ground that the donee's unfettered right to enjoyment and possession had
been postponed until the death of the donor.
Not all transfers which take effect at death are taxable. For ex-
ample, in In re Sebree's Estate,94 the decedent entered into an escrow
agreement for the sale of real estate. The grantee was given possession
during the life of the grantor-decedent and was to pay her $175 each month
for two years and $150 per month thereafter until the grantor's death,
after which the grantee was to pay $4,000 to an heir of the grantor.
The court found this transaction to be a bona fide sale and not taxable
as a transfer to take effect at death.
In 1962, the Montana Supreme Court decided the case of Estate of
Maher9" and may or may not have added to the development of section
91-4402. The opinion is unusually cryptic, describing the decedent's prop-
erty only as a power to revoke a trust which she had created many years
before her death. The court held that the "existence of this right of
revocation, modification or change, constituted a reservation of an in-
terest of property" which, when relinquished by her death, constituted
a taxable transfer taking effect at death. It has been suggested 96 that
this holding was erroneous in the absence of an express Montana statutory
provision similar to the federal estate tax provision transfers with re-
served powers to alter, amend, or revoke. 97 However, since the primary
question in the Maher case dealt with the taxability of intangible prop-
erty located outside the state, and not the application of section 91-4402,
it may be best to consider the Court's reference to the taxability of re-
served powers of revocation as dicta until such time as the court is
squarely faced with the problem.
In the most recent of the reported Montana cases under this section,
Estate of Hess,98 the Court was presented with the problem of whether
there was a taxable transfer as a result of the death of one of two life
tenants, when the second was still alive. The Court found that there was
no transfer to the remaindermen since their possession remained in
abeyance until the death of the second life tenant. However, the Court
found, and apparently correctly so, that there was a taxable transfer of
the deceased life tenant's interest to the surviving life tenant. The court
1122 Mont. 9, 195 P.2d 989 (1948).
0122 Mont. 509, 206 P.2d 553 (1949).
05140 Mont. 476, 373 P.2d 520 (1962).
"See Poore, ''The Montana Inheritance Tax,' 26 Mont. L. Rev. 173, 177 (1965).
0Int. Rev. Code, 1954, Sec. 2038.
"145 Mont. 552, 403 P.2d 748 (1965).
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noted that the remaindermen would not receive a taxable transfer until
the death of the second life tenant.
E. Powers of Appointment
The Montana inheritance tax statute dealing with powers of appoint-
ment is section 91-4404 which provides in pertinent part:
Whenever any person or corporation shall exercise a power of
appointment derived from any disposition of property, . . . such ap-
pointment, when made, shall be deemed a transfer taxable under
the provisions of this act, in the same manner as though the prop-
erty to which such appointment relates belonged absolutely to the
donee of such power and had been bequeathed or devised by such
donee by will, ...
Continuing, the statute provides that the omission or failure to exercise
such power shall likewise be a taxable event.
Section 91-4404 differs sharply from the federal estate tax law
regarding powers of appointment. 99 The federal law recognizes two
classes of powers, i.e., general powers which are taxable, and special or
non-general powers which are not taxable.' 0 0 The failure of Montana
law to recognize this distinction subjects both kinds of powers to tax
which probably accounts for the infrequent use of powers of appoint-
ment in Montana.10
Nonetheless, there are many situations which may call for the use
of a power of appointment despite the fact that it may be subject to the
Montana inheritance tax. For example, the testator may wish to create
a life estate for his wife, but allow her to appoint the remainder among
their children according to their need at the time of his wife's death,
which he presumed will post-date his own. The use of a special power of
appointment may allow the wife's estate to avoid the federal estate tax
on the remainder. Consequently, the Montana practitioner should not
totally discard powers of appointment as useful estate planning tools.
Many articles and treatises have been written which describe the topics
of consequences of powers of appointment under the federal estate tax
'Int. Rev. Code, 1954, Sec. 2041(b)(i).
I'OA general power of appointment is defined as one exercisable "in favor of the
decedent, his estate, his creditors or the creditors of his estate." Federal estate tax
law recognizes exceptions to this definition which are generally called "non-general"
or "special" powers of appointment: (1) Powers which enable the donee to appoint
only to a limited class of persons, which excludes the donee, his estate, his creditors
and the creditors of his estate; (2) A power to consume, invade or appropriate
property for the benefit of the donee which is limited by an ascertainable standard
relating to the health, education, support or maintenance of the donee; (3) Powers
exercisable by the donee only in conjunction with (i) another person, (ii) or the
creator of the power, (iii) or a person having an interest in the property which is
adverse to the donee's interest, such as the remainderman. Lapses, as well as exer-
cises of powers of appointment may likewise be taxable.
1
'To date, there are no reported Montana cases which deal specifically with the taxa-
tion of powers of appointment.
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and which evaluate them as estate planning devices. 0 2 Those topics are
outside the scope of this article which is confined to an examination of
the Montana statutes.
Section 91-4404 is not without its peculiarities and pitfalls. The act
is workable in the classic situation, such as where A transfers property
to B in trust, giving B a power to appoint the property by will to C.
When B exercises the power, there is no doubt that he has made a
testamentary transfer which is subject to the inheritance tax. But what
if A gives B a general power of appointment which B, 20 years before
his death, exercises in favor of C? B has made an inter vivos gift. Is
this taxable under 91-4404? It would appear that it is, despite the fact
that the theory of section 91-4404 is to tax substitutes for testamentary
dispositions. It seems incongruous that an inter vivos transfer made 20
years before the transferor's death can be taxed as an inheritance.
However, it should be noted that the Montana law provides no other means
by which to tax inter vivos gifts, other than those made within three years
of death which can be classed as gifts in contemplation of death. Because
the beneficial interest vests immediately, the gift is not taxable under
91-4402 as a transfer intended to take effect at death. Since 91-4404
does not limit the taxable transfers to those made by will, it must be
concluded that an inter vivos exercise of a power of appointment is tax-
able under this section. Thus, at least for sake of argument it appears
that section 91-4404 is as much a gift tax as it is an inheritance tax.
However, there is no evidence that the Montana State Board of
Equalization has ever attempted to apply section 91-4404 to inter vivos
exercises of powers of appointment. 103 Should that board ever exercise
this prerogative, it appears that several problems will arise for Montana
taxpayers. For example, there is a pragmatic problem of the collection
of the tax. Section 91-4403, R.C.M. 1947 provides that the tax is imposed
when the transferee becomes beneficially entitled; however, section 91-4415
does not require its payment until the date of death. What should be done
with the tax money in the interim? Section 91-4415 also places a lien on
the transferred property for ten years from the date of death. What if
the transferred property had been perishable or had been wasted between
"See e.g., Bohrer, "Powers of Appointment, Uses and Abuses," Estate Planning and
Income Taxation: 2, 5th Annual Tax School (1958), Montana State University
Press, pp. 426-459; 4 CCH, Inheritance Estate, and Gift Tax Reporter, paa. 1540
et seq.; 1 CCH Federal Estate and Gift Tax Reporter, paras. 1575-1610; Simes,
Future Interests, 168 et. 'seq. (1951) ; Restatement, Property, See. 318 (1940) ;
Griswold, "Powers of Appointment and the Federal Estate Tax," 52 Harv. Law
Rev. 929 (1939); Leach, "Powers of Appointment and the Federal Estate Tax-
A Dissent," 52 Harv. Law Rev. 969 (1939); Johnson, "Taxation of Powers of
Appointment," 29 Taxes 965 (1951); Lowndes and Kramer, "Federal Estate and
Gift Taxes," Chs. 12, 41 (1962); Rabkin and Johnson, 3 Current Legal Forms
With Tax Analysis, pp. 550-564 (1968); Parr, "An Estate Planner's Handbook";
Rice, "Family Tax Planning."
"This statement is based on information obtained in an interview with the Director
of the Inheritance Tax Department, Montana State Board of Equalization.
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the time of the inter vivos transfer and the donee's death when the lien
attaches? It does not appear this possibility has been forseen by the
legislature.
As noted, the tax is imposed by 91-4403 at the time of the transfer.
The state would probably accept payment of the tax at that time although
it is not due until the date of the donee's death under 91-4415. If such
tax payment is made at the time of transfer, however, there is considerable
doubt whether the donee is entitled to either an inheritance or gift tax
credit on his federal estate tax return. This is because such credits are
dependent upon the property being included in the donee's estate at the
time of death. 0 4 If the donee exercises the power years before his death,
the property could not be included in his gross estate for federal estate
tax purposes and he would not be entitled to either credit.
There is also a question as to the intrinsic fairness of taxing certain
types of transfers to the donee of the power of appointment. For
example, a donee could be given a special power of appointment, i.e., one
exercisable only in favor of a certain class. Assuming this class is
limited to the children of the donor, the donee, or his estate, is nonethe-
less personally liable for the tax.10 5 This does not seem fair, inasmuch
as the donee was precluded from any enjoyment of the property.
Another unusual aspect of section 91-4404 is that it taxes the exercise
of a power of appointment by a corporate-donee. Because the tax is due
on the date of death of the donee,10 6 it is interesting to speculate whether
the tax could ever be collected from a corporate-donee with a perpetual
existence. Does this suggest a means of tax avoidance? Assume A
formed a family corporation to which he transferred all of his assets in
trust for his issue, giving the corporation a special power to appoint the
corpus and income to his issue. Since the corporate-donee receives only
mere legal title, that transfer is tax free, because under 91-4403 only
the transfer of a beneficial rather than a legal interest is taxable. Then,
if the corporate-donee exercises the power and vests the beneficial interest
in the children, a tax would be imposed on the transfer under 91-4403, but
would not be due until the death of the donee. Since the corporation has
the possibility of perpetual existence, there is a possibility that the
tax would never have to be paid. This scheme is certainly not recommended
as being a fool-proof method by which to avoid the payment of death taxes
in Montana, but it does pose an interesting problem. It is submitted that
such a scheme would, of necessity, be challenged by the State Board of
Equalization. The focal point of the Board's attack would probably be
that this was an obvious attempt to evade, rather than avoid taxation, and
'Int. Rev. Regs., See. 20.2011-1(a) (State death tax credit), and Sec. 20.2012-1(a)(gift tax credit).
1 R.C.M.1947, Sees. 91-4404, 91-4415.
'"R.C.M.1947, Sec. 91-4403.
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as being contrary to the policy of the law. In the absence of any court
decision regarding powers of appointment in Montana, no reliable pre-
diction can be made as to how the court might rule.
It must be concluded that section 91-4404 is not a well-written
contribution to the Montana inheritance tax law. Its failure to recognize
the exercise of special powers as a non-taxable event discourages the use
of powers of appointment. Its taxation of inter vivos exercises of powers
of appointment impinges on its integrity as an inheritance tax provision.
The fact that the state board charged with its administration has never
enforced this aspect of this provision speaks well of the statute's clarity.
The fact that it places tax liability on the donee of a special power who
is precluded from possible enjoyment of the property casts doubt upon
its fairness regarding burden distribution. For these reasons, it is hoped
that a future legislature will give serious attention to the revision of
this section.
F. Joint Ownership
Property passing to a surviving co-owner is subject to the Montana
inheritance tax on the theory that the creation of the joint form of
ownership is in effect a substitute for a testamentary disposition of all
the property which cannot be shown to have ever been owned by the sur-
viving co-owner. Section 91-4405,17 R.C.M. 1947 expressly applies the
inheritance tax against jointly owned property to the extent of the de-
cedent's interest in the property at the date of death.
A working knowledge of section 91-4405 requires an understanding
of that section's interrelationship with other sections, especially section
91-4402 which taxes transfers in contemplation of death and transfers in-
tended to take effect at death. For general analytical purposes, as a
crude rule of thumb, the practitioner can generally assume that the
decedent's undivided interest which passes to the surviving joint tenant
is the subject of the tax under 91-4405; whether the survivor's undivided
interest is also taxed as a result of the decedent's death is determined
under section 91-4402. That is, if the surviving co-tenant received his
interest within three years of the decedent's death, there is a presumption
that the transfer is taxable as having been made in contemplation of
'
0TSection 91-4405 provides: "Whenever any property, however acquired, real or per-
sonal, tangible or intangible, including government bonds of the United States, in-
scribed in co-ownership form, or held in joint tenancy by two or more persons, or
as tenants by the entirety, or is deposited in any bank or other depository in the
joint names of two or more persons and payable to the survivor or survivor or
survivors of them upon the death of one of them, the right of the survivor or sur-
vivors to the immediate possession or ownership is a taxable transfer. The tax is
upon the transfer or decedent's interest, one-half or other proper fraction, as evi-
denced by the written instrument creating the same, as though the property to which
the transfer relates belonged to the joint tenants, tenants by the entirety, joint
depositors, holders in co-ownership form, or persons, as tenants in common, and had
been for inheritance tax purposes, bequeathed or devised to the survivor or survivors
by will, except such part thereof as may be shown to have originally belonged to
the survivor and never to have belonged to the decedent. This setion shall not be
construed to repeal or modify the provisions of section 91-4402.''
[Vol. 31
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death. If, however, the transfer is made without the presumptive period,
the surviving co-tenant's interest may not be taxable, unless the transfer
was one which was to take effect at death.
The application of section 91-4405 and its relationship to other sec-
tions of the Montana inheritance tax law can best be illustrated by
example.
(1) At the time of his marriage to W, H transferred $10,000 from
his private checking account to a joint savings account with right
of survivorship, the account being in his name and that of W, his
newly acquired wife. No withdrawals are made, and H dies the
next year.
The entire $10,000 is subject to the inheritance tax. $5,000 of
the joint account represents H's proportionate but undivided share
of the account. This share vests in W as a result of H's death.108
It is taxable under 91-4405 as a transfer of the decedent's share of
jointly held property. The other $5,000, or W's proportionate share,
is also taxable, but the tax is imposed under section 91-4402 as a
gift made in contemplation of death, unless of course, the presumption
can be overcome. However, if H had died more than three years
after creation of the joint account, W's share would not be subject
to the inheritance tax. Instead, it would be treated as a completed,
and non-taxable inter vivos gift.10 9
If W had predeceased H, there would be no tax, assuming that
H could prove that the entire amount originally belonged to him
alone, and never belonged to W. 110
(2) With his own funds, H purchases U. S. Savings Bonds, listing
himself, jointly with W, his wife, as payees. He informs W of the
purchase, and places the bonds in a safety deposit box to which each
have independent access. H dies more than three years after the
transaction.
Only one-half of the bond's value at the time of H's death are
taxable. This one-half represents H's share of the bond's value. W's
share is not taxable as a gift in contemplation of death since it
was made more than three years before H's demise."' Assuming a
completed gift to W, her share is not taxable under 91-4402 as a
transfer intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at death.
'"St. Bd. of Equalization v. Cole, 122 Mont. 9, 195 P.2d 989 (1948).
"In re Marsh's Estate, 125 Mont. 239, 244, 234 P.2d 459, 462 (1951).
"lR.C.M.1947, See. 91-4405 provides that: "'. . . such part thereof as may be shown
to have originally belonged to the survivor and never to have belonged to the dece-
dent" is excepted from the inheritance tax. Also see Estate of Parks, 145 Mont.
333, 401 P.2d 83 (1965); In re Powell's Estate, 142 Mont. 174, 232 P.2d 342 (1951);
In re Kuhr's Estate, 123 Mont. 593, 270 P.2d 83 (1950).
11R.C.M.1947, See. 91-4402.
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(3) With his own funds, H purchases U. S. Savings Bonds, naming
himself as payee, or in the alternative D, his daughter. He does
not inform D of the purchase and places the bonds in a safety deposit
box to which he alone has access.
The entire amount of the bonds is taxable under 91-4402 as
a transfer intended to take effect at death. It is not taxable under
91-4405 as a joint interest because the bonds were not held in joint
ownership. There was no completed gift because the element of
delivery was lacking; accordingly, D's interest did not vest until H's
death. 112 Even if D had access to the safety deposit box, the gift
would not be complete since the bonds were registered in alternative
rather than joint names. 1 3
(4) Over the years, H deposited a total of $15,000 of his salary
in a savings account held jointly with W, his wife. W never con-
tributed any of her own money to this account. H and W used $10,000
of this money to purchase real estate, the title to which was taken
in their names as joint tenants with right of survivorship. W pre-
deceased H. At that time, $5,000 remained in the savings account.
Despite the fact that the real estate was purchased with money
which had been earned only by H, W's proportionate share of the
real estate is taxable under 91-4405. This is because there was a
completed gift to W when the money was deposited in the joint
savings account. Thus, her death precipitated a transfer of her
proportionate share of the real estate back to H.114 However, none
of the $5,000 remaining in the joint savings account is taxable as
a result of W's death for the source of that fund is directly trace-
able back to H's earnings and it can be shown that none of it
originally belonged to W.115 Consequently, the $5,000 falls within
the exemption under section 91-4405.116
(5) When he was married in 1960, H conveyed real estate which
he owned to himself and W, his wife, as tenants in common. He
recorded the transaction in 1965 and died that same year.
Had H recorded the conveyance immediately, only one-half of
the property's value, i.e., H's proportionate share, would be subject
to tax under 91-4405 as a transfer of jointly held property. How-
ever, section 91-4408, R.C.M. 1947 treats the recordation date as the
date of transfer. Therefore, since the recordation date was within
r
2in re Brown, 122 Mont. 451, 206 P.2d 816 (1949); St. Bd. of Equalization v. Cole,
supra, note 108.
"
3Id.
"'St. v. Hanson, supra, note 110, 125 Mont. at 178.
11id. This case has been attacked as unsound in 26 Mont. L. Rev. at p. 180.
"'Supra, note 110 (F-3).
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three years of death, it is presumed that H made a gift of one-half of
the property to W in contemplation of death. Consequently, the
entire value of the property is subject to tax.
Section 91-4405 applies to all types of joint interests, viz., joint
tenancies, tenancies in common, and tenancies by the entirety. However,
it should be noted that an estate by the entirety is not a permissible
means of ownership of property in Montana. 117 The Montana Supreme
Court has expressed the opinion that modern statutes have eliminated
the basis for the creation of such an estate and accordingly treat such
form of ownership as a joint tenancy."58
G. Insurance
Section 91-4406 provides:
All insurance payable upon the death of any person over and above
fifty thousand dollars ($50,000), shall be deemed a part of the
property and estate passing to the person or persons entitled to
receive the same and if payable to more than one person the said
fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) exemption shall be prorated between
such persons in proportion to the amount of insurance payable to
each.
In State v. Cline,"9 the estate included approximately $65,000 in insur-
ance proceeds which were to be paid both to the estate and named benefi-
ciaries. The Montana Supreme Court held that the $50,000 insurance
exemption was available without regard to the identity of the beneficiary.
Consequently, an insured could rely upon this opinion to name his estate
as sole beneficiary and thus inject up to $50,000 into his estate which
would be exempt from tax. However, the existence of a strong dissent
by two-fifths of the court's membership 120 may create gounds for pause
before relying on the Cline decision. In that dissent, it was carefully
pointed out that the majority of cases draw a distinction for inheritance
tax purposes between proceeds payable to the estate and those payable to
named beneficiaries. Such cases usually hold the former to be subject
to death taxes.' 2' There appears to be merit in the dissenting opinion
inasmuch as the proceeds payable to the estate will pass as part of the
estate by will, or by intestate distribution, and thus would otherwise fall
within the general taxing power of section 91-4401.
In Montana, the proceeds and interest from a matured endowment
contract are not insurance and are fully taxable. 22 On the other hand,
annuity proceeds are given the same status as insurance proceeds and are
'
1Clark v. Clark, 143 Mont. 183, 387 P.2d 907 (1936); In re Marsh's Estate, 125
Mont. 239, 234 P.2d 459 (1951).
'Clark v. Clark, supra, note 117, 143 Mont. 192.
1''132 Mont. 328, 317 P.2d 874 (1957) ; also see the companion case of State v. Midland
National Bank, 132 Mont. 339, 317 P.2d 880 (1957).
'It should be noted that both dissenting justices have since retired while two of the
three justices constituting the majority have remained on the court.
InState v. Cline, 132 Mont. 328, 332, 317 P.2d 874 (1957).
L'In re Harper's Estate, 124 Mont. 52, 218 P.2d 927 (1950).
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thus entitled to the $50,000 exemption. 123 However, in the majority of
states the holding is that annuities providing a death benefit are not
insurance policies, and are not subject to insurance exemptions. The
general reasoning is that in an annuity, the company's obligation is not
to indemnify on the happening of a contingent event causing loss. The
company agrees to repay the amount paid by the annuitant. Such repay-
ment is usually made in installments during the annuitant 's life and if..
at his death, there is an unpaid balance, such balance is paid to a designated
beneficiary. This is deemed to be a transfer of property intended to take
effect at or after the death of the transferor and is thus taxable under
almost all state inheritance tax statutes.
124
If an insurance policy is payable to a trust and the trust instrument
alone provides for distribution of named beneficiaries, the $50,000 ex-
emption is still available. 125 However, the insurance exemption is allowed
only once, i.e., it will not follow the proceeds through two estates. Thus,
if the beneficiary dies before receiving the proceeds, the proceeds are
fully taxable in his estate.
12 6
PROPERTY SUBJECT TO TAX
It is axiomatic that the state must have jurisdiction over the prop-
erty transferred before it can impose a tax on the transfer. Whether
the state has the requisite jurisdiction depends upon the interrelationship
of three factors. The first is whether the decedent was a resident or
nonresident at the time of his death. The second requires a determination
of the type of property involved. The third factor is the situs, or loca-
tion, of the property at the time of the transfer.
The distinction between residents and nonresidents is determined
in terms of domicile rather than actual residence. The Montana Supreme
Court has established the rule that the place of one's residence is prima
facia the place of his domicile, but that proof of domicile requires a
showing not only that his residence was within the jurisdiction, but also
that he had the intention of making that residence his home. 127 This
distinction is important inasmuch as the rules for taxation of the several
classes of property differ somewhat in their application in taxing resident
and nonresident property.
"SIn re Fligman's Estate, 113 Mont. 505, 129 P.2d 627 (1942); St. v. Midland Nat'l
Bank, supra, note 119; St. v. Hammerstrom, 133 Mont. 469, 326 P.2d 699 (1958).
'
24Cases illustrating this principle include: Est. of G. K. Barr, 104 Cal. App. 2d 506,
231 P.2d 876 (1951); Borchard v. Schallerer, 12 Ill. 2d 240, 145 N.E.2d 585 (1957);
Succession of Pedrick, 207 La. 640, 21 So. 2d 859 (1945) ; Garos v. State Tax Com.,
109 A.2d 844 (N.H. 1954); Est. of Atkins, 129 N.J. Eq. 186, 18 A.2d 45 (1941);
Est. of H. Welsh, 177 N.E. 2d 710 (Ohio, 1960); Est. of Bayer, 345 Pa. 308, 26
A.2d 202 (1942); Est. of Smiley v. Inh. Tax Div.. .... Wash ..... , 216 P.2d 212 (1950).
"In re Coleman's Estate, 132 Mont. 339, 317 P.2d 880 (1957).
L' In re Estate of Holland, 136 Mont. 324, 347 P.2d 473 (1959).
"2In re Coppock's Estate, 72 Mont. 431, 234 P. 258 (1925).
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The nature of the property is determined by its property law
characterization within one of the three commonly accepted classes, i.e.,
real property, tangible personal property, or intangible personal property.
This characterization is necessary in order to establish the situs of the
property, situs being a necessary prerequisite to the state's power to tax.
Generally speaking, situs of real and tangible personal property is the
place where the property is physically located, 128 whereas the situs of
intangible personal property may be divided so that more than one state
may acquire jurisdiction to levy death taxes on the transfer. 29
RESIDENTS
Real Property
Real estate located within the state and belonging to a resident
decedent is subject to the Montana inheritance tax. 30 No state, including
Montana, has ever attempted to tax the devolution of realty located outside
its jurisdiction.' 3 ' Few problems are apt to arise when the resident de-
cedent holds the real estate in fee. Thus, if a Montana resident owns
Montana real estate at his death, it will be subject to the Montana inheri-
tance tax. If he owns real estate outside Montana, under the general rule
it will not be subject to the Montana inheritance tax, although the situs
state may exercise its right to levy a nonresident death duty on the
property.
However, serious problems can arise in the frequently encountered
situation where a resident decedent had sold foreign realty and was hold-
ing an unsatisfied contract for deed at the time of his death. For example,
a Montana resident may have sold California real estate by contract of
deed prior to his death so that on his death he was actually holding
only a bare legal title as trustee for the benefit of the buyer. As far
as the decedent had been concerned, his real property interest had been
equitably converted into personal property evidenced by the contract of
sale.
In his will, the decedent may direct the disposition of his real
property wheresoever located and thus effect what is called "equitable
conversion ''1 2 of his real property into personal property. Under such
circumstances, it is clear that Montana cannot impose a tax on the
" Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U.S. 473 (1925).
'1State Tax Commission of Utah v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174 (1942); Graves v. Schmid-
lapp, 315 U.S. 657 (1942); Curry v. MeCanless, 307 U.S. 357 (1939); Graves v.
Elliott, 307 U.S. 383 (1939).
" R.C.M.1947, Sec. 91-4401.
"nSee Louisville & Jeffersonville Ferry Co. v. Kentucky, 188 U.S. 385 (1903). It is of
interest to note that in 1962, section 2031 of the Internal Revenue Code was amended
to subject to the federal estate tax real property owned by United States citizens
but which was located in a foreign country.
1121'Equitable conversion is that constructive alteration in the nature or character of
property whereby in equity real estate is for certain purposes considered as per-
sonality, or whereby personality for similar considerations, is regarded as real estate
and in either instance it is deemed to be transmissible and descendible in its con-
verted form." 27 Am. Jur. 2d, Equitable Conversion, See. 2, p. 483.
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California property because it is outside its jurisdiction. But can it
impose a tax on the unrealized proceeds from the contract of sale? On
first impression, it would appear that because the contract actually repre-
sents the real property, it should not be taxed. This argument finds
support if the property returns to the legal title holder if the buyer de-
faults. On the other hand, it may be argued that if the contract had been
performed prior to the date of death, the decedent would have had cash
at the time of his death, instead of real estate and the devolution of the
cash would have been taxable.
The question turns on whether the jurisdiction applies the doctrine
of equitable conversion in situations like those hypothecated above. New
York and Illinois are among those which do not ;133 Washington and North
Dakota have accepted it.134 The Montana Supreme Court has never had
the occasion to decide whether the doctrine should apply to proceeds from
the sale of foreign property owned by a resident decedent, but in In re
Briebach's Estate13 the court did apply the doctrine to preclude taxation
of proceeds received by a nonresident from the sale of Montana real
estate. Thus, if continuity can be presumed, it would seem that the Mon-
tana courts would apply the doctrine to tax the proceeds to be received
by a resident decedent's estate from the sale of foreign realty. This analogy
is supported by the fact that proceeds from mortgages are likewise subject
to the Montana inheritance tax.
136
A problem may arise when the resident decedent's estate includes
a partnership interest in foreign realty. For example, assume that a
Montana resident decedent owned a partnership interest in Nevada realty.
Since Nevada has no death tax, he will escape all death duties on this
property unless his partnership interest works an equitable conversion
to enable Montana to tax his intangible partnership interest. It would
appear that under the current state of the Montana case law, no tax
would be imposed on this interest. For example, in In re Perry's Estate,"'
the Montana Supreme Court refused to apply the doctrine of equitable
conversion to tax a nonresident decedent's partnership interest in Mon-
tana realty. Consequently, it would be a logical extension of the Perry
case to say that the doctrine would likewise not apply to tax a resident
decedent's partnership interest in foreign realty.
Regardless of how logical this may appear, however, the weight of
American authority is to the contrary.'38  Ordinarily partnership real
"'Re Swift, 137 N.Y. 77, 32 N.E. 1096 (1893); Connel v. Crosby, .... Ill ..... , 71 N.E.
350 (1904); Accord: Alaska, Opinion of Attorney General, Apr. 29, 1953; Maryland,
Op. Atty. Gen., May 7, 1940, 25 Op. Atty. Gen. 599; So. Dakota, Op. Atty. Gen., Aug.
20, 1937.
"Est. of E. Eilermann, 179 Wash. 15, 36 P.2d 763 (1934); Est. of G. C. Ryan,
.... N.D ._ , 102 N.W.2d 9 (1960).
=132 Mont. 437, 318 P.2d 223 (1957).
133 Atty. Gen. Op. 117 (Mont. 1909).
m121 Mont. 281, 192 P.2d 532 (1948).
"'4 CCH, Inheritance, Estate and Gift Tax Reporter, para. 1065E (1968 ed.).
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property is considered to be personalty as among the partners themselves.
With the enactment of the Uniform Partnership Act,'139 Montana has
embraced the position that real property acquired in the partnership
name belongs to the partnership, not the individual partners. 140 Con-
sequently, each partner owns only an undefined share of the partnership
assets and his interest cannot be traceable to any specific asset. Ac-
cordingly, after the Uniform Partnership Act was enacted by several states,
it was not surprising that courts of those jurisdictions held that partner-
ship assets are considered intangible personal property. 14  Such decisions
have the same effect as the application of the doctrine of equitable con-
version, i.e., by treating the partnership interest as an intangible asset,
it is possible to shift the situs of the interest away from the jurisdiction
where the real property is located and tax it in the state of the de-
cedent's residence.
Because the Perry case arose prior to Montana's enactment of the
Uniform Partnership Act, it is unknown whether that case is still good
law. It may not make much difference economically to the decedent whose
partnership assets are located in any state other than Nevada, for if
his interest is not taxable by Montana it will probably be taxable by the
situs state.
Tangible Personal Property
Under section 91-4401, R.C.M. 1947, all tangible personal property
owned by a Montana resident is subject to the Montana inheritance tax
regardless of where it is found. 142 However, section 91-4414 (4), R.C.M.
1947, exempts tangible personalty located outside the state provided it
is outside of Montana for purposes other than deposit or safekeeping.' 4 3
Had the Legislature ended section 91-4414 (4) at that point, the statute
would have been an expression of the majority rule in the United States
which recognizes that tangible personalty is subject to death taxation
1 sR.O.M.1947, Sec. 63-101 et. seq.
1R.C.M.1947, Sec. 63-108.
"'See e.g., Perkins v. Okla. Tax Comm'n.. .... Okla., 428 P.2d 328 (1967); Est. of
Havemeyer, 17 N.Y.2d 216, 217 N.E.2d 26 (1966); Est. of Gordon v. Dept. of Rev.,
Ky. Bd. of Tax Appeals, Nov. 9, 1965. However, in Wyoming it was held that an
oil and gas leasehold in Wyoming which was owned by a partnership was not con-
verted into personal property. Op. Atty. Gen., Feb. 3, 1965.
" 'R.C.M.1947, Sec. 91-4401 provides: "A tax shall be and is hereby imposed upon any
transfer of property, real personal or mixed . . ." R.O.M.1947, Sec. 91-4453 defines
'property" as including "all personal property within or without the state."
'"R.C.M.1947, Sec. 91-4414(4) provides:
(4) Property without the state exempt, when. No tax shall be imposed upon
any tangible personal property of a resident decedent when such property is
located without this state, and when the transfer of such property is subject
to an inheritance or transfer tax in the state where located and which tax
has actually been paid, secured or guaranteed, provided such property is not
without this state temporarily nor for the sole purpose of deposit or safe-
keeping; and provided the laws of the state where such property is located
allow a like exemptlfn in relation to such property left by a resident of that
state and located in thtm state.
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only by the state in which it is located.144 Instead, however, the Mon-
tana Legislature added a proviso to section 91-441.4 (4) which purports to
tax a resident's personalty which is located outside Montana unless
(1) the situs state imposes either "an inheritance or transfer tax . . .
which tax has actually been paid, secured, or guaranteed," and (2) the
situs state also allows "a like exemption in relation to such property
of that state and located in this state (Montana)." This proviso thus
permits Montana to impose a tax on a transfer of a resident decedent's
personalty located in Nevada simply because the personalty is not subject
to any Nevada death tax.
145
It appears that this proviso is invalid. In 1925, two years after
the enactment of section 91-4414, the United States Supreme Court flatly
held in Frick v. Pennsylvania146 that the situs of tangible personalty
for inheritance and estate tax purposes is the state where it is located
rather than the domicile of the decedent owner. In Curry v. McCanless, 4 7
that Court further held that tangible personal property is subject to
estate and inheritance taxation only in the state where it is physically
located. There, the Court said:
The power of government and its agencies to possess and to ex-
clude others from possessing tangibles and thus, to exclude them
from enjoying rights in tangibles located within its territory, af-
fords adequate basis for an exclusive taxing jurisdiction . . . the
benefit and protection of laws enabling the owner to enjoy the fruits
of his ownership and the power to reach effectively the interests
protected for the purpose of subjecting them to payment of a tax,
are so narrowly restricted to the state in whose territory the physical
property is located as to set practical limits to taxation by others.14s
Thus, if Montana has been exacting death duties in reliance on the proviso
of section 91-4414 (4), it has done so in contravention of established
legal policy. The propriety of the proviso does not appear to have been
judicially tested before the Montana Supreme Court.
The concept of situs of tangible personalty involves more than a
determination of its actual physical location; some degree of permanency
is required. As an example, it has been held that jewelry in the posses-
sion of a New York resident who died in France while on vacation, did
not lose its New York situs and was thus subject to that state's death
tax.149 On the other hand, portraits loaned by a New York resident to a
Pennsylvania museum were determined to have satisfied this requirement
of permanency and thus lost their New York situs. 150
'"See cases annotated at 85 C.J.S., Taxation, Sec. 1139, note 61. Also see 4 CCH,
Inheritance Estate and Gift Tax Reporter, paras. 1610-16100.
"'Neveda has no death taxes.
11268 U.S. 473 (1925).
"'7307 U.S. 357, 123 ALR 162 (1939). Accord: City Bank Farmer's Trust Co. v.
Schnader, 8 F.Supp. 815, (D.C. Pa. 1934), affm'd, 293 U.S. 112 (1935).
l4SSupra, note 146, 307 U.S. at 361.
"'Est. of Martinau, N.Y. Surr. Ct., N.Y. Co., N.Y.L.J., Feb. 5, 1968.
"'City Bank Farmer's Trust Co. v. Schnader, supra, note 147.
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Problems may sometimes arise when distinguishing tangible and in-
tangible personalty. For example, are accounts in banks which are located
outside Montana, tangible personalty and thus subject to the Montana
inheritance tax? No Montana case has addressed itself to this question,
but cases from other jurisdictions may provide adequate guidelines. In
Blodgett v. Silberman'51 the United States Supreme Court held that a
Connecticut resident's savings account in a New York bank was intangible
personal property and hence taxable under the laws of Connecticut.
Likewise, the Court held that United States Savings Bonds were also
intangible, whereas bank notes and coins found in the decedent's New
York safe deposit box were tangible personalty and thus subject to the
New York tax. Colorado has similarly ruled that cash is tangible and tax-
able where situated. 15 2 The Maryland Attorney General created an interest-
ing dichotomy; he ruled that coins are tangible, but paper currency is
intangible. 153
Intangible Personal Property
Intangible personal property owned by a Montana resident is subject
to tax wherever it is located. 154 This is in accord with the majority of
jurisdictions which generally accept the rule that intangible property may
have a tax situs in every jurisdiction which has dominion over the
tangibles or persons whose relationships are the source of the intangible
property or which has extended protection or other benefits to the in-
tangible property.155
In Montana, R.C.M. 1947, section 91-4453 defines intangible property
as including "all monies, stocks, bonds, notes, securities and credits of
all kinds, secured or unsecured." The Montana Attorney General has
ruled that mortgage notes are intangibles for inheritance tax purposes. 156
In Estate of Maher'57 the Montana Supreme Court ruled that intangible
personal property owned by a Montana decedent, including the assets
of a revocable lifetime trust administered in Pennsylvania, is subject
to the Montana inheritance taxes.
NONRESIDENTS
A nonresident's real and tangible personal property is generally
held to be subject to the death taxes of the situs state. Montana follows
this rule.'15
Whether a nonresident's intangible personal property is subject
51277 U.S. 1 (1928), affirming 105 Conn. 192, 134 A. 778 (1926).
'WEst. of Waldron, 84 Colo. 1, 267 P. 191 (1928).
133 Op. Atty. Gen. 390 (Maryland, July 29, 1948).
''R.C.M.1947, Secs. 91-4401, 91-4405.
5'Supra, note 129.
...3 Op. Atty. Gen. 117 (Mont., 1908-1910).
1140 Mont. 476, 373 P.2d 520 (1962).
-R.C.M.1947, 91-4401(2).
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to the Montana inheritance tax will depend on whether the property gained
a "business situs" in Montana, which in turn depends on whether the
nonresident's interests were at least partially protected by Montana
law.159 For example, it was held in State ex rel. Walker v. Jones'6 ° that
promissory notes and mortgages on Montana land which were held by a
nonresident decedent were dependent for their collection upon the Montana
law. This protection provided sufficient basis upon which to apply the
Montana inheritance tax.' 6' In In re Perry's Estate'61 the court found
that a nonresident's partnership interest in Montana mining property
was subject to the Montana inheritance tax inasmuch as the property it-
self was protected by Montana law. In 1942, the State Board of Equali-
zation issued a tax memorandum stating that all intangible personal
property owned by nonresidents, and which was situated within Montana,
was subject to the Montana inheritance tax.163 Such property, said the
Board, includes stock of Montana corporations, bonds issued by debtors
domiciled in Montana, money deposited with Montana banks, trust com-
panies, or building and loan associations, as well as interests in businesses
carried on in Montana.
However, no tax will be imposed if the decedent comes within the
exemption provided by section 91-4413, R.C.M. 1947. That section exempts
from taxation intangible personal property if the decedent was a resident
of a state or territory which, at the time of transfer, did not tax in-
tangibles of nonresidents of that jurisdiction or provided for the reciprocal
exemption thereof. This section was applied in In re Brieback's Estate6
4
wherein the Montana Court found that although the vendor's interest in a
contract of sale of Montana real estate was a taxable intangible, the prop-
erty qualified for the exemption inasmuch as the decedent was a resident
of California which had a reciprocal exemption statute.
DEDUCTIONS
A. Generally
Certain amounts of the decedent's gross estate are not subject to
taxation, but are allowed as deductions. Deductions are not to be confused
with exemptions. Deductions include such items as the decedent's unpaid
debts, the expenses of his last illness, his funeral expenses and the
costs of administering his estate. An exemption is usually an amount cer-
tain which is passed on to the heirs and is excluded from tax by virtue
of the heir's relationship to the decedent. Deductible items are not in-
cluded in the taxable estate on the theory that the property is passed to
l1Supra, note 129.
'180 Mont. 574, 261 P. 356 (1927).
'Accord, 5 Op. Atty. Gen. 525 (Mont., Apr. 15, 1914).
16212 Mont. 280, 192 P.2d 532 (1948).
" Tax Memo No. 114, Mont. St. Bd. of Equalization, May, 1942. (interpreting State
Tax Comm'n. of Utah v. Aldrich, supra, note 129).
16132 Mont. 437, 318 P.2d 223 (1957).
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the recipient pursuant to his right, usually contractual, to receive the
property. To tax such a transfer would violate the Constitutional provision
prohibiting the impairment of the obligation of contracts.16 5 An exemption,
on the other hand, is simply the legislature's way of encouraging a
testator to provide for his close relatives after his death.
Only certain items can qualify as deductions. Section 91-4407, R.C.M.
1947, permits the following deductions and no others:
• .. debts of the decedent owing at the time of death, expenses
of funeral and last illness, all Montana state, county, municipal and
federal taxes, including all penalties and interest thereon, owing
by decedent at the date of death, the ordinary expenses of admin-
istration, including the commissions and fees of executors and
administrators and their attorneys actually allowed and paid, in-
cluding attorney's fees, filing fees, necessary expenses and closing
costs incident to proceedings to terminate joint tenancies, termina-
tion of life estates and transfers in contemplation of death, and
any and all other proceedings instituted for the determination of
inheritance tax, and federal estate taxes due or paid.
In In re McAnelly's Estate16 6 the Montana Supreme Court said that
this statute ". . . is clear and direct and declares that no deduction
shall be allowed, excepting those specified therein. '167 Each type of
deduction warrants individual comment.
B. Debts
All "debts of the decedent owing at the time of death" are deductible
from his transferable estate. 168 This phrase is not defined either by
statute or Montana case law. Under the usual circumstances it needs no
clarification. It is only logical that the decedent's unsatisfied contractual
obligations qualify as deductions. Further, it is obvious that only those
contractual obligations "owing at the time of death" are deductible, for
the decedent certainly cannot contract for debts after he has died. Con-
sequently, it would appear that the phrase "at the time of death" is re-
dundant.
Whether this is a harmless redundancy has yet to be judicially
determined. The question may arise if a judgment is entered against a
decedent after his death. It might be argued that the judgment represents
a debt which did not arise until after death on the basis that a judgment
is not enforceable until entered on the judgment roll.169 If the debt
arose after death, it would not 'be deductible under section 91-4407,
R.C.M. 1947 and it could then be argued that the payment of the judgment
creditor would be taxable as if it were a legacy. There does not appear
to be a logical reason to tax transfers to a post-death judgment creditor
"
6Mont. Const., Art. III, See. 11.
1"127 Mont. 158, 258 P.2d 741 (1953).
1'Id., 127 Mont. at 172.
"'R.C.M.1947, See. 91-4407.
' R.C.M.1947, Sec. 93-5708.
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while permitting a deduction for transfers to a pre-death contractual
creditor. Therefore, it is submitted that a future legislature should obviate
this inequitable distinction.
Other jurisdictions have encountered difficulties arising from the
meaning of the term "debt." It has been held, for example, that a pay-
ment to settle or prevent a will contest is not a deductible debt 7 ' al-
though there is also authority to the contrary.'7 1 The test for deduc-
tibility has been said to be whether the debt is valid in law and enforce-
able, 17 22 not whether it has been proved or established 173 or allowed by
the court174 or even if it has been paid by the estate.1
75
C. Funeral Expenses, Expenses of Last Illness
Absent statutory or case law clarification, it can generally be pre-
sumed that the amount deductible as a funeral expense or an expense of
the final illness is limited to a reasonable expenditure. In many juris-
dictions the reasonable cost of a monument and maintenance of the burial
plot qualify as deductions, but a $20,000 monument expense has been dis-
allowed 76 as has the expense of a monument which exceeded 2% of the
value of the net estate. 1'7 7 New Jersey disallows deductions of funeral
expenses and those of last illness if they have been prepaid by the de-
cedent prior to his death. 1 78 It is to be expected that such prepaid expenses
are likewise not deductible in Montana inasmuch as their prepayment
has already served to reduce the estate prior to death and their post-death
allowance would result in a double deduction.
D. Taxes
Section 91-4407, R.C.M. 1947 permits a deduction of
. . . All Montana state, county, municipal and federal taxes, in-
cluding all penalties and interest thereon, owing by decedent at the
date of death....
Thus, if a decedent dies owing property, income or any other kind of tax
to the state, county, or municipality, it is clear that his estate or bene-
ficiaries are entitled to a deduction equal to the amount of the tax due.
'"Est. of J. Waldron, 84 Colo. 1, 267 P. 191 (1928); Est. of H. Graves, 242 Ill. 212,
89 N.E. 978 (1909); Est. of G. Wells, 142 Ia. 255, 120 N.W. 713 (1909); Indiana
Dept. of St. Rev. v. Kitchin, 119 Ind. App. 422, 86 N.E. 2d 96 (1949). Such pay-
ment would not be a deductible expense of administration. People v. Upson, 338
Ill. 145, 170 N.E. 276 (1930).
raIn re Hawley's Est. 214 Pa. 525, 63 A. 1021 (1906).
112In re McKittrick's Estate, 175 Misc. 767, 25 N.Y.S.2d 42 (1940); In re Lederer's
Estate, 158 Misc. 796, 286 N.Y.S. 984 (1936).
"'In re Westurn, 152 N.Y. 93, 46 N.E. 315 (1897) ; In re Lambrecht's Est., 112 Wash.
645, 192 P. 1018 (1920); Also see 61 C.J.S., Taxation, p. 1706, n. 28.
"'In re Parrott's Est., 199 Cal. 107, 248 P. 248 (1926) ; People v. Tatge, 267 Ill.
634, 108 N.E. 748 (1915).
17aIn re McKittrick 's Estate, supra, note 172.
"76Est. of Volkering, 253 Wis. 186, 33 N.W.2d 263 (1948).
I'Cline Est., 20 D. & C.2d 676 (Pa. O.0., 1959).
'-Est. of Ingham, 128 N.J. Eq. 93, 16 A.2d 457 (1940).
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Not so clear, however, is the deductibility of federal taxes. Section
91-4407 appears to allow federal taxes as a deduction but section 91-4421
expressly provides that ". . . no deduction shall be made for any federal
estate, inheritance, succession or transfer taxes paid to the United
States." This contradiction was resolved by the Montana Supreme Court
in 1937 in In re Clark's Estate.179 The court noted that the phrase deny-
ing the deduction was enacted in 1927, whereas the section permitting
the deduction was enacted in 1935. The court applied the rule of con-
struction that when two statutes, enacted at different times, contradict
each other, the one enacted on the later date must prevail. Because the
statute permitting the deduction was the later one, the deduction was
allowed.
More than two decades have passed since In re Clark's Estate was
decided. Yet the law which was there held to be invalid still remains.
This is simply one more example of the Montana Legislature's lamentable
attitude of inattention in regard to the state's death tax laws.
The only taxes which qualify as deductions are those paid to the
State of Montana, its political subdivisions or the federal government.
Thus, death taxes paid to another state are not allowable as a deduction.
However, in the case of a resident decedent, such taxes paid to another
state may qualify as a credit against the Montana inheritance tax under
section 91-4412, R.C.M. 1947. The amount of this credit is limited by
the following proviso of section 91-4412:
Provided, however, that the amount to be so credited shall in no
event exceed that amount which the resident decedent was taxed
on that property in Montana. (emphasis added)
The effect of this proviso is to allow a credit only when the property is
subject to tax both by Montana and another state, presumably the situs
state. Because neither realty nor tangible personalty located without
Montana is subject to Montana tax, it appears that the credit will apply
only in regard to taxes paid in respect to intangible property which has
a situs in both states.
Penalties and interest paid on Montana and federal taxes are also
allowable deductions. This allowance was enacted in 1957,110 probably
as a result of a suggestion by the Montana Supreme Court in In re Mc-
Anelly's Estate 181 where the court was forced to disallow interest paid
on federal tax as a deduction. The McAnelly case was decided in 1953.
The law was not amended until 1957. Why it took two Legislatures four
years to make this simple amendment will probably never be known.
1105 Mont. 401, 74 P.2d 401 (1937).
" Laws of Mont., 1957, Ch. 5, sec. 1.
1127 Mont. 158, 258 P.2d 741 (1953).
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E. Ordinary Expenses of Administration
Perhaps the most problematical area in the field of deductions are
those expenditures which are attempted to be qualified as "ordinary
expenses of administration.' '182 The difficulty centers around the mean-
ing of the word "ordinary." Frequently, expenses will be incurred which
are necessary, although not ordinary in the sense that they are not in-
curred in the majority of cases. For example, in In re Warren's Estate18
an accountant was hired to evaluate the worth of the decedent's interest
in a family corporation. The Montana Supreme Court found that such
valuations are usually made by appraisers but allowed the accountant's
fees as a deduction. The court reasoned that although such fees are not
"ordinary" they were "necessary" to the administration of the estate.
Most jurisdictions allow expenses of administration to be deducted pro-
vided they are "reasonable.' u 4 If the Montana State Board of Equali-
zation ever promulgates regulations in the inheritance tax field it is
suggested that the word "ordinary" be defined as meaning both neces-
sary and reasonable.
When section 91-4407 was enacted, the legislature evidently felt that
certain types of expenses were ordinary for they expressly included
certain expenses, e.g., fees or commissions paid to executors, adminis-
trators, and attorneys, costs of terminating joint estates, life estates, and
transfers in contemplation of death as well as the costs of proceedings
instituted for the determination of inheritance and federal estate taxes.
Fees or commissions paid to executors, administrators and their at-
torneys must have been both allowed and paid before they qualify as
deductions. However, in In re Warren's Estate8 5 the court allowed the
accountant's fees as a deduction despite the fact that they had neither
been allowed nor paid. The court justified this exception on the ground
that the requirement that the claim be allowed and paid referred only to
"commissions and fees of executors and administrators and their at-
torneys" and "do not relate to the ordinary expenses of administra-
tion. ' '186
An executor's fee is expressly allowable as a deduction but a
trustee's fee is not. 8 7 However, both types of fees are excluded from
"'R.C.M.1947, Sec. 91-4407 permits as a deduction:
• .. the ordinary expenses of administration, including the commissions and
fees of executors and administrators and their attorneys actually allowed and
paid, including attorney's fees, filing fees, necessary expenses and closing
costs incident to proceedings to terminate joint tenancies, termination of life
estates and transfers in contemplation of death, and any and all other pro-
ceedings instituted for the determination of inheritance tax, and federal
estate taxes due or paid.
'1'128 Mont. 395, 275 P.2d 843 (1954).
1185 C.J.S., Taxation, section 1185 and cases cited therein.
's'Supra, note 183.
'"Supra, note 183, 128 Mont. at 401, 402.
"sOfficial letter from Montana State Board of Equalization, July 7, 1928.
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taxability if the testator bequeaths property to them in lieu of their
commissions or allowances. 88 The amount excluded, however, is limit-
ed to the amount prescribed by law as being the value of their services. 8 9
F. Apportionment of Deductions
Whenever a resident or a nonresident decedent leaves an estate
consisting of property located within Montana and property located out-
side Montana, section 91-4421 (3)190 may preclude the deduction of all
but a portion of the total amount of deductions allowed by section 91-4407.
Under such circumstances, the beneficiary or the estate may deduct only
the same percentage of the deductions allowed under section 91-4407 as
the value of property in Montana bears to the gross estate, or in other
words and as an oversimplification, if only 10% of the gross estate is
located in Montana, only 10% of the deductions permited by Montana are
allowable. The manner by which the apportionment is computed is best
illustrated by examples.
1. At H's death he owned only two pieces of real estate; one was
located in Montana and was valued at $60,000, the other was located
in State X and was valued at $40,000. His allowable Montana de-
ductions amounted to $1,000; no additional deductions were allowable
by State X. H left all of his property to S, his son. S is entitled
$ 60,000
to a deduction on only $600, ( X $1,000 = $600). The net
$100,000
estate subject to the Montana inheritance tax would be $59,400
($60,000 - $600).
2. Assume the same facts as in example 1 above except that State X
permits a deduction of $500 for taxes paid to that state. The ap-
portionment computations as they would appear on Montana's In-
heritance Tax Form 3A, line 23191 would be as follows:
"The decedent at time of death owned property located partly within
and partly without the State of Montana:
"R.C.M.1947, See. 91-4420.
'Trustee's fees are set by the court, the fee being that amount "as the court or judge
may deem to be just and reasonable." R.C.M.1947, Sec. 91-4202.
'R.C.M.1947, Sec. 91-4421(3), provides:
Whenever a t.ax may be due from the estate, or the beneficiaries therein,
of any resident or nonresident decedent upon the transfer of any property,
when the property or the estate left by such decedent is partly within and
partly without this state, or upon any stocks, bonds, mortgages, or other
securities representing property or estate partly within and partly without
this state, any beneficiary of such estate shall be entitled to deduct only his
proper proportion of that portion of the total debts and expenses of ad-
ministration which the gross estate in Montana or within its jurisdiction
bears to the gross estate both within and without this state . ..
'"
1Form 3A is a form prescribed by the Montana St. Bd. of Equalization and is en-
titled: "Final Report to the Court and to the State Board of Equalization and
Petition to Have Inheritance Tax Determined."
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(a) The gross estate outside of Montana amounts
to ..............................................................................-- .. $ 40,000
(b) The gross estate in Montana amounts to ............ $ 60,000
(c) Total gross estate wherever situate (a + b)
am ounts to ............................................................. $100,000
(d) Ratio between Mont. gross est. & total gross est.
wherever situate is ................................................... .6
(e) Total deduction allowed in Mont. (shown under
6, page 1) are ..................................................... .$ 1,000
(f) Total ded. allowed outside of Mont. are ------------ $ 500
(g) Total ded. allowed for entire estate wherever
situate are .................................................................. $ 1,500
(h) Proportionate amt. of total ded. to be ded. from
M ont. gross value is .......................................... .. $ 900
(i) Mont. net est. sub. to tax amts. to ................... $ 59,100
3. H, a nonresident of Montana, dies leaving a total estate of
$150,000 which consists of:
Life insurance proceeds ............................................. $ 60,000
Tangible personalty located in State X .................... $ 50,000
Real estate located in State X . ---............................... $ 20,000
Real estate located in Montana .................... ............. $ 15,000
Stock in a Montana corporation ............................... $ 5,000
$150,000
H's estate and beneficiaries are entitled to the following deductions
in State X:
Death taxes owing State X at death ............................ $ 1,000
Income & property taxes owing State X at death .----- $ 500
Debts owing at death .................................................. $ 500
Widow's allowance ..................................................... $ 5,000
Funeral expenses ........................................................... $ 200
Costs of administration ............................................... $ 300
$ 7,500
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H's estate and beneficiaries are entitled to the following deductions
in Montana:
Taxes owing Montana at death ............------------------------ $ 300
Attorney fees ------------------------------------------------------------------------ $ 200
$ 500
H leaves his estate equally to S, a Montana resident and D, a re-
sident of State X. The form 3A computation for the apportionment
of deductions would be as follows:
(a) The gross estate outside of Montana amounts
to ---------------------------.-------------------------.......... ----- $ 70,000192
(b) The gross estate in Montana amounts to ---------.......$ 30,000193
(c) Total gross estate wherever situate (a + b)
amounts to --------- .....................------------------------------ $100,000
(d) Ratio between Mont. gross est. & total gross est.
wherever situate is -----------------------------..................... . 3
(e) Total deduction allowed in Mont. (shown under
6, page 1) are ------------------------------------------ -------- $ 500
(f) Total ded. allowed outside of Mont. are ------. $ 1,500194
(g) Total ded. allowed for entire estate wherever
situate are ----------------- ................----------------------- -----.$ 2,000
(h) Proportionate amt. of total ded. to be ded. from
Mont. gross value is --------------- ............----------------------- $ 600
(i) Mont. net est. sub. to tax amts. to ---------- ---..$ 29,400
Note that the computations are not affected either by the fact that the
decedent was a nonresident nor by the fact that the beneficiaries are re-
sidents of different states.
EXEMPTIONS
The Montana inheritance tax permits two types of exemptions-
charitable and personal.
112Tangible personalty ($50,000) plus State X real property ($20,000).
"
93Life insurance ($60,000 less $50,000 exemption) plus Montana real estate ($15,000),
plus Montana securities ($5,000).
' 
0 Montana does not recognize the widow's allowance, although other states do.
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A. Charitable Exemptions
In 1923, the Montana legislature enacted a law' 95 providing that all
transfers to certain institutions were totally exempt from tax. The list
of institutions eligible for such tax free bequests were limited to the
state and its institutions, all municipal corporations within the state,
and corporations or voluntary associations organized under Montana
law which performed solely religious, charitable, educational or public
purposes, provided that the property transferred was used by these
organizations solely within the state of Montana. 19 6
In 1963, the law was amended, 97 substantially conforming the de-
finition of charitable organizations with the federal estate tax for charit-
able contribution deductions. 198 The law is now codified as section
91-4414(1) of the Revised Codes of Montana, 1947. The 1963 amendment
carried forward the 1923 provisions of allowing exemptions of the total
amount transferred to the state, its institutions and municipal corpora-
tions; it also carried forward the 1953 provisions exempting transfers to
crippled children's hospitals. However, it placed qualifying restrictions
on transfers to other charitable institutions. Charitable institutions are
now defined by the statute as
. . . any society, corporation, institution, or association . . . founda-
tion or trust, organized and operated exclusively for religious,
charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes...
An organization is initially disqualified as a charitable organization if
any part of its earnings inure to the benefits of any private shareholder
or other individual, or if a substantial part of the organization's activities
include the carrying on of propaganda or otherwise attempting to influence
legislation. If the tranferee organization does not have either of these
disqualifying features, it qualifies as a donee to which tax free testa-
mentary donations can be made if it also meets any of the following con-
ditions:
(1) It must be organized solely for religious, charitable, scientific,
literary, or educational purposes. It will not be sufficient that the
tranferee's articles of incorporation or its by-laws state that it is
organized solely for one or all of these purposes. The statute re-
quires that the organization be both organized and operated as a
charitable organization. 199
(2) If the property is transferred on the condition that it be used
solely within Montana, the transfer will be totally exempt.2"'
'Laws of Mont., 1923, Ch. 65, Sec. 4.
"OThis law remained unchanged for 30 years when, in 1953, the legislature expanded
the list of charitable organizations to include privately owned crippled children's
hospitals within the United States to which Montana children were gratuitously
admitted and treated. Laws of Mont., 1953, Ch. 105, see. 1.
"'7Laws of Mont., 1963, Ch. 218, sec. 1.
"'mInt. Rev. Code, 1954, see. 2055 (P.L. 1011, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., see. 1).
"'R.C.M.1947, Sec. 91-4414(1) (a).
'1R.C.M.1947, See. 91-4414(1) (b).
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(3) If the transferee organization is organized under laws other
than Montana's then a transfer to such organization will be exempt
only if:
(a) The state under which laws the transferee was organized
does not, as of the date of the decedent's death, tax similar trans-
fers by its residents to a charitable institution organized under
the laws of Montana;
(b) or, if such state provided for a reciprocal exemption for
transfers to Montana organizations. 20 1
To date, there are no reported Montana cases dealing with charitable
exemptions. This may indicate that the Montana law is clear and explicit.
However, it is more likely that the lack of reported litigation reflects
either: (1) astute estate planning by Montana practitioners, or (2) a
lenient attitude on the part of district courts or the State Board of
Equalization in allowing charitable exemptions to go unchallenged. This
observation is not made lightly. Other states and the federal government
have not experienced the same lack of litigation as has Montana regarding
the subject of tax free bequests to charitable organizations.
One of the major areas of contention is as to what constitutes a
charitable organization. The Montana statute does not furnish a definition
other than to say that it is one organized for "religious, charitable,
scientific, literary or educational purposes," but this is hardly sufficient.
For example, does an association qualify as a religious organization if
its primary purpose is to sell religious books to promote church attend-
ance, 20 2 or if it operates timber mills and a hotel with which to train
ministers ?203 Does an organization have a charitable purpose if it is
organized to operate a public park only for white people. 20 4 Do private
hospitals,2 05 homes for the aged,20 6 organizations which make distributions
to needy persons, 20 7 blood banks, 20 8 or societies for the prevention of
cruelty to animals 20 9 qualify as charitable organizations? Organizations
which failed to qualify as scientific organizations under the federal
income tax law include foundations to do research in the field of com-
mercial oil extraction, but which made the results known to only a few
'R.C.M.1947, See. 91-4414(1) (c) (iii).
''Scripture Press Foundation v. U.S., 28 F.2d 800 (Ct. Cls. 1961). (Held not to be
a religious organization).
'The Golden Rule Church Association, 41 T.C. 719.
'Evans v. Newton 382 U.S. 296 (1966) (Held not to be a charitable organization),
accords: Rev. Rul. 67-325. "Charitable organization" defined in: Susan Young
Eagan, 43 F.2d 882 (5th Cir., 1930); Second National Bank of New Haven v. U.S.,
87 S. Ct. 1776 (1967); Schoellkopf v. U.S., 124 F.2d 982 (2d Cir., 1942).
'See Rev. Rul. 56-185, 1956-1 C.B. 202; Rev. Rul. 65-269, 1965-2 C.B. 159; Sonora
Community Hospital, 46 T.C. 519; Davis Hospital, 4 T.C.M. 312 (1945).
"Cf. Rev. Rul. 57-467, 1957 -2 C.B. 313 with Rev. Rul. 61-72, 1961 -1 C.B. 188 and
Rev. Rul. 64-231, 1964 -2 C.B. 137.
mSee Rev. Rul. 56-304, 1956 -2 C.B. and Rev. Rul. 55-406, 1955 -1 C.B. 73.
'Rev. Rul. 66-323, 1966 -2 C.B. 216.
"See Rev. Rul. 66-359, 1966 -2 C.B. 219.
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subscribers, 210 as well as organizations which were operated to carry on
dog shows, despite the geneological information that was thereby accrued.211
Many cases and revenue rulings have discussed the meaning of the term
educational organizations.212
Section 91-4414(1) fails to provide an adequate definition of what
is meant by charitable organization. Indeed, it would be a rare legislature
that would undertake the task of enacting such guidelines into law.
Normally these guidelines are found in regulations.213 Unfortunately,
Montana has no inheritance tax regulations, but when and if any are
adopted, it is hoped that they will define in some detail those types of
organizations which qualify for tax free bequests. In the meantime, the
cautious practitioner who is advising a client who is ready to give to
an existing organization might resort to a directory maintained by the
United States Treasury Department which lists those organizations which
currently qualify as charitable organizations, contributions to which are
deductible for federal tax purposes. 214
If the testator desires to create his own charitable organization
after his death, and to fund it by leaving property to his executor or
trustee to pay to the organization upon its creation, it appears that
section 91-4414 would permit the exemption for such a transfer. A similar
situation arose in New York; the exemption was contested but allowed in
the same manner as though the organization had been in existence at the
time of the testator's death.
215
B. Personal Exemptions
The 1969 Montana Legislature created some important changes 216 in
the amounts permitted as personal exemptions. The exemption allowed to
the husband of the decedent was raised from $10,000 to $20,000, equal to
that allowed a widow,21' and the exemption allowed to the minor children
-oUniversal Oil Products Co. v. Campbell, 181 F.2d 451 (7th Cir., 1950).
mAmerican Kennel Club, Inc. v. Hoey, 148 F.2d 920 (2d Cir., 1945).
2 See e.g., Int. Rev. Regs., sec. 1.501(c) (3)-1(d) (3); Rev. Rul. 60-193, 1960 -1 C.B.
195. As to art and art application organizations, see Rev. Rul. 66-46, 1966 -1 C.B.
133; Rev. Rul. 64-174, 1964 -1 C.B. 183; Rev. Rul. 66-179, 1966 -1 C.B. 139. As to
organizations to disseminate information see e.g., Rev. RUl. 67-138, 1967-18 I.R.B. 12;
Rev. Rul. 67-150, 1967-19 I.R.B. 10; Rev. Rul. 66-220, 1966-2 C.B. 209. As to organi-
zations to promote sports, see e.g., Rev. Rul. 65-2, 1965-1 C.B. 227; Rev. Rul. 64-275,
1964-2 C.B. 142. As to student loan and scholarship organizations, see Rev. RUl.
61-87, 1961-1 C.B. 191.
"'For example, definitions for income tax purposes of various types of charitable
organizations are defined in Int. Rev. Regs. 1954, see. 1.501(c) (3)-1(d) (1-5).
"'See "Cumulative List of Organizations Described in Section 170(c) of the Internal
Revenue Code" which is available from the Superintendent of Public Documents,
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.
nlEst. of F. LeFevre, 233 N.Y. 138, 135 N.E.2d 203 (1922).
2 6Laws of Mont., 1969 Ch. .... sec. 1 (H.B. 262).
2 7Laws of Mont., 1923, Ch. 65, sec. 4 created an exemption of $17,500 for a widow,
and $5,000 for a widower; Laws of Mont., 1965, Ch. 244, see. 1, raised the widow's
exemption to $20,000 and widower's to $10,000.
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of the decedent was raised from $2,000 to $5,0000. The exemption that may
be claimed by adult children and lineal ancestors remains unchanged from
the $2,000 figure originally allowed by the 1923 legislature. 218 Issue
of the decedent, as used here, is defined by section 91-4414(2), R.C.M.
1947 as including besides lineal issue, adopted children and their issue
as well as mutually acknowledged children and their issue. Mutually
acknowledged children are defined as those to whom the decedent stood
in the mutually acknowledged relation of parent for a period of at least
ten continuous years prior to the transfer and which relationship began
at or before the child's fifteenth birthday.
In re Clark's Estate,219 is the only reported Montana case dealing
with the meaning of the term "adopted child." That case held that the
adoption proceedings must actually have been completed before the child
could be eligible for the exemption. The proceedings bad not been com-
pleted as of the testator's death, and the exemption was denied, notwith-
standing the fact that the decedent had expressed his desire to adopt
the child and had been supporting and educating the child for a number
of years prior to his death.
Most problems which arise under personal exemption statutes deal
with whether a transferee can qualify within a favored class in order to
avail himself of the exemption. These problems are usually simple to
resolve by referring to the clear intent of the statute. However, some-
times a beneficiary who has been bequeathed two or more valuable pieces
of property will attempt to claim a separate exemption for each. For
example, he may be given one parcel of land which is taxable as a gift
made in contemplation of death, and may also receive another parcel under
the decedent's will. He will be allowed only one personal exemption re-
gardless of the number of taxable bequests or gifts received. 220 Also
problematical are transfers to family corporations. Such transfers have
been held not to qualify for personal exemptions, even though the only
shareholders of the corporation were the widow and children,221 or the
children alone.
222
C. Computations and Apportionment of Exemptions
Gifts which qualify as charitable exemptions are totally tax free
regardless of the amount received by the organization. Thus, if a testator
left one dollar or one million dollars to a charitable organization no tax
would be imposed on the transfer.
The allowable personal exemptions are to be taken only from the
first $25,000 received by the transferee. For example, a widow or a
widower has a $20,000 personal exemption. Thus, if he or she received
"'Laws of Mont., 1923, Ch. 65, sec. 4.
n9105 Mont. 401, 74 P.2d 401 (1937).
"%See Lovejoy v. Morrison, 116 Vt. 453, 78 A.2d 679 (1951).
'Est. of Renwick, 126 N.J. Eq. 564, 10 A.2d 293 (1939).
'Est. of Sobieski, 16 Fiduc. Rep. 549, 41 D. & C.2d 447 (1966).
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a $25,000 legacy, only the last $5,000 would be subject to the tax. If
the legacy amounted to $29,000 only $9,000 would be taxable; the first
$5,000 of which would be subject to tax at the primary rate of 2%,223
whereas the last $4,000 would be taxable at twice the primary rate, or
4%.224 A brother or sister of a decedent is entitled to an exemption of
only $500. Therefore, if a person received a $25,000 bequest from his
brother, he would be taxed on $24,500 at the primary rate of 4%.
However, there are instances in which a beneficiary will not be
entitled to claim his full exemption. Section 91-4421(3), R.C.M. 1947
provides that:
... As to his Montana exemption, each beneficiary shall be entitled
to deduct only that portion represented by the ratio between his
interest in the property in this state or within its jurisdiction, and
his interest in the entire estate.
To illustrate, assume H leaves his minor child real estate valued at
$4,000 located in State X, and also leaves him Montana real estate valued
at $6,000. The minor child is entitled to a maximum personal exemption
of $5,000. However, since the property received was neither "in this
state or within its jurisdiction" the exemption must be apportioned. Here,
only 3/5 of the property received by the minor child was located in
Montana; therefore, he is entitled to claim only 3/5 of his maximum allow-
$ 6,000
able exemption or $3,000 (- X $5,000 = $3,000). This amount
$10,000
would be applied to reduce the amount of the Montana property subject
to tax to $3,000 (Montana real estate valued at $6,000 less $3,000 allow-
able exemption).
VALUATION
No problem connected with the administration of inheritance taxes
is more important than the problem of valuation. The amount of tax is
dependent upon the value of the property transferred. Therefore, the tax
cannot be accurately determined unless the value has first been properly
ascertained.
The value of property is its clear market value. This principle,
while easily stated, is often difficult in application. The process of
valuation or of computing clear market value can be a complex process.
The business of property valuation has become an occupation requiring
no small amount of expertise. Professional appraisers can be found in
almost every city. The list of books and chapters of treatises which
have been written and are devoted solely to describing and explaining
R.C.M.1947, See. 91-4409(1).
"'R.C.M.1947, See. 91-4410(1).
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the principles of valuation is a long one.225 This chapter is neither designed
to parrot existing works nor to suggest innovations. Its purpose is to
outline the established Montana procedures for arriving at valuation and
to alert the practicing attorney to some of the more frequently encountered
pitfalls.
A. Procedures
One of the first things that an attorney who has been retained to
probate an estate must do is to see that the property owned by the de-
cedent is inventoried and valued. If he feels competent to do so, he may
value the property himself. However, in most cases it is better to have
the valuation made by a disinterested party who is neither the attorney
nor a beneficiary. Therefore, upon the application of the attorney or any
other interested party, the district court will appoint a special appraiser.226
The appraiser's job is to value the decedent's property at its clear market
value and report his findings to the court.
To assist the appraiser in performing his task, the Legislature has
granted him certain powers.227 After his appointment, he will notify by
mail all interested persons of the time and place when he will appraise
the property. He is empowered to issue subpoenas and compel the at-
tendance of witnesses who can furnish him information as to the property's
worth. He may require that the witnesses testify under oath as to value.
In most cases, it will not be necessary for him to exercise these powers and
in many cases he will be able to value the property without the assistance
of witnesses. After he has secured sufficient information with which to
value the property he will return his findings to the court.
The court thereupon holds a hearing at which time it will examine
the appraiser's report and hear any objections thereto. At this hearing,
the court will officially determine the value of the estate.228  The tax
is then computed on that value. As a matter of practice, the attorney
will normally have made all the computations for the convenience of the
court. If the appraiser's report indicates the existence of a future
interest in the estate, the court can require its valuation by the Com-
missioner of Insurance.2 29 The State Board of Equalization is to be kept
informed of each stage in these proceedings and can intervene to assist
at any point.
As is apparent, the procedural aspects of valuation are relatively
logical and uncomplicated. Procedural problems, when they arise, are
"See e.g., Bonbright, James C., Valuation of Property (2 vols. 1937); Paul, Randolph
E., Federal Estate and Gift Taxation, Ch. 18 (1941) and supple uent (1946) ; Powell,
"Estate Tax Valuation" in The Estate Tax Handbook, 369 et. seq. (ed. by Lasser,
1951).
1R.C.M.1947 Sees. 91-4427, 91-4429.2 2R.C.M.1947, See. 91-4428.
'R.C.M.1947, See. 91-4429.
'R.C.M.1947, See. 91-4431.
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usually the result of a re-evaluation being made after the tax has been
paid. The Montana inheritance tax law requires that the appraisal be
made as soon after the date of death as is practicable. 2 0 After the district
court has determined the tax, the property is subject to reappraisal only
within one year from the date of the court's order.2 3' However, the federal
government will frequently assign a different value to the property than
was declared on the Montana return. If this is done more than one year
after the district court has determined the tax, Montana is precluded from
reappraising the property. Therefore, it is important that the original
appraisal be an accurate one.
B. General Principles of Valuation
The degree of an appraisal's accurary will be partially dependent
upon the type of property being appraised. The Montana statutes provide
meager guidelines for the appraiser other than to say that he must value
the property at its "clear market value ''232 or at its '' fair market value. '2a33
Although there is probably no difference in the meaning of these two
phrases, the statutes define neither one. The federal estate tax regulations
define fair market value as:
• . . the price at which the property would change hands between
a willing buyer and a willing seller; neither being under any com-
pulsion to buy or to sell and both having reasonable knowledge of
relevant facts. 23 4
This classic definition is so vague and general as to be virtually meaning-
less in deciding specific valuations. Its use is somewhat suspect in light
of the holding in State v. Hanson2 3 where the Montana Supreme Court
held that "the consideration paid for property is not determinative of
its value for inheritance tax purposes. ''236 It is not clear from the decision
whether the court meant to repudiate the federal definition of fair
market value, but it seems unlikely that it did. There, the property had
been purchased three years before death and there was an obvious dis-
parity between the value at the date of purchase and the date of death.
Consequently, it can probably be assumed that the language of the Hanson
case can be qualified as meaning that the consideration paid for prop-
erty is not determined by its value "when a substantial period of time
has elapsed between the date of purchase and the date of death."
It would be a rare situation where the decedent's estate consisted
of property which had not changed in value between the date of purchase
and the date of death. Consequently, the appraiser will normally not
rely on the purchase price as the sole indicia of value. He will instead
°R.C.M.1947, Sec. 91-4432.
2'R.C.M.1947, Sec. 91-4439.
212R.O.M.1947, Sees. 91-4407, 91-4432.
2"R.C.M.1947, Sec. 91-4428.
'Int. Rev. Reg., Sec. 20.2031-1(b).
125 Mont. 174, 232 P.2d 342 (1951).
mIbid., 125 Mont. at 181.
[Vol. 31
42
Montana Law Review, Vol. 31 [1969], Iss. 2, Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol31/iss2/1
THE MONTANA DEATH TAXES
attempt to employ one or a combination of the three commonly recognized
methods of valuation, i.e., the comparable sales method, the capitalization
of earnings method, or the reproduction method.
237
Comparable Sales Method: Some types of property can be valued by
looking to the prices received from sales of identical or comparable
property. Of course, no two pieces of property are truly identical. They
may be comparable, but in making the comparison certain factors must
be considered. Location, for example, may give one piece of real property
more value than the piece adjacent to it. The date of sale of the property
being compared may have affected the purchase price. The identity or
relationship of the parties involved in the comparable sale may influence
the price. All facts must be considered. Obviously, the greater the num-
ber of comparable sales, the more reliable the comparison.
Capitalization of Earnings Method: This method is an attempt to
determine what an investor would pay for the property by capitalizing the
earnings from it. It can be quite complex, but its underlying theory can
be simply stated, i.e., property which can or does produce income is valued
according to the amount of capital required to produce the same amount of
income which is or can be produced by the property being valued. For
example, if the estimated annual net income from a property is $40,000,
and a fair rate of return from such property would be ten percent, the
value of the property would be $400,000 ($40,000 divided by .10). This
method has two defects which are immediately apparent: (1) the fair
rate of return is based on an estimate, and (2) the future income from
the property is not certain.
Reproduction Method: The third method is to determine the cost
of reproducing the property at the time of valuation. Usually, this method
is the least satisfactory of the three suggested. If the property is old,
it may be impossible to determine the reproduction cost as of the more
recent date of death; if it is so old as to be outmoded or discontinued,
the cost of reproduction may give an obviously high and unreal value
image. However, the method is useful if for no other reason than as a
means with which to set a ceiling.
It is suggested that these three methods be used as a check upon
each other. If the results obtained from their use are tempered by common
sense, experience, expert judgment, and opinion, the ultimate figure ar-
rived at will normally be acceptable. However, no general rule, formula,
or method can be prescribed which would cover every type of property.
Each kind of property has peculiar characteristics by which it can be
valued. Some general observations can be made as to those classes.
"Discussed in detail in Lowndes & Kramer, Estate and Gift Taxes, p. 445 (2d., ed.
1962).
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C. Real Property
Realty, like all other types of property, must be valued at its clear
market value as of the decedent's death. Ordinarily, the best method
of valuation is the comparable sales method. Of course, care should be
exercised to insure that the comparable sale is truly comparable, i.e.,
that it involved property of like size and location, that the buildings
located thereon, if any, were of similar style, age, condition, and used
for similar purposes, and that the sale was made reasonably near the date
of death as to decrease the possibility of a significant change of value
in the interim.
It is preferable that real estate be valued by expert appraisers.
The services of realtors, land agents, professional appraisers or engineers
may be required to insure accuracy.
Special problems may arise with realty, such as how to value less
than the whole interest. This may be required when the decedent had mort-
gaged his property or owned a leasehold. Under the federal estate tax,
mortgaged property is included in the gross estate at its full value, but
the mortgage is deducted as a claim against the estate.238 Under Montana
law, because there is no express provision for making such a deduction, it
appears that the appraiser would not err by simply listing the property at
its full value less the value of the mortgage. It should make no difference
in determining the property's value, for the same value should result by
both methods. There does not seem to be a prescribed rule for valuing a
lessor's leasehold interest. It appears to be a question of fact in each
case. One rule frequently followed is to establish present value by the
amount which the actual rental value exceeds the rent reserved in the
lease. In the case of a mercantile building, the value of the leasehold is
the present net worth of the estimated income to be received during the
entire term of the lease, plus the income to be received during the re-
newal period, less the expenses of operation and management of the prop-
erty. Depending on the term of the lease, the future value may have to
be substantially discounted to arrive at an accurate present value.
In Montana it is not uncommon for a person to die seized of mineral,
timber or oil rights. Expert appraisers are essential in the valuation of
these types of interests. All of these interests have a common character-
istic: their life is limited by eventual exhaustion and depletion. Usually
the critical factor is the recoverable reserve which can seldom be accurately
appraised by one who is not an expert in the field. This type of property
is frequently valued with the aid of what is known as Hoskold's formula.
2
.
8 9
D. Tangible Personal Property
There should be little difficulty in valuing tangible personalty.
Automobiles, jewelry, household goods, farm machinery, and other persona
'1Int. Rev. Code, 1954, Sec. 2053.
2Explained in St. Louis Screw Co., 2 B.T.A. 649 (1925).
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effects usually can be valued by use of the comparable sales or reproduction
methods. As with all other property their value for inheritance tax pur-
poses is their clear market value.
E. Listed and Active Securities
Besides real estate, most large estates consist of considerable possessions
in the securities market. For valuation purposes, securities fall into
two classes: those frequently traded in recognized markets and closely
held securities. The value of public securities, or those which are traded
in recognized markets can readily be ascertained by a reference to the
trading prices on the day of death. However, this is not always as
simple as it may seem. For example, is a large block of stock worth
the same per share as a single share? This question has attracted con-
siderable attention and no definite answer has yet been reached. Perhaps
one of the best suggested solutions is to treat the question as a matter
of evidence and not indulge in doctrinaire assumptions.
Counsel often finds that the stock owned by the decedent was traded
within a given price range on the date of his death. For example, it may
have sold as high as $100 per share and as low as $90 per share. Ordinarily,
assuming that a proportionate amount of shares sold at both prices, the
mean value, or $95 would be acceptable for tax purposes. If the decedent
dies on a day when the stock did not trade, the mean value of the stock's
highest and lowest prices on the nearest trade days before and after the
date of death will be acceptable.
Unlisted securities can be more problematical than listed securities.
The federal estate tax regulations 240 provide that the actual ask and bid
prices may be used for valuing these securities in the same manner as listed
securities. However, care must be exercised to determine that sales of
unlisted securities were not forced sales or due to some artificial trading
influence which did not present a true picture of the stock's actual value.
F. Closely Held or Inactive Securities
Closely held securities pose the most difficult problems of valuation.
They are seldom, if ever, traded and consequently have no established
market. Any sales of closely held stock should be rigorously examined
before attempting to use the comparable sales method of valuation. Such
sales are usually accompanied by some intent to make a gift and are thus
not true indicators of the stock's actual worth.
The United States Treasury has established some general guidelines
with which to value closely held securities. Revenue ruling 59-60241 lists
the following considerations:
(a) The nature of the business and its history.
"'Int. Rev. Regs., See. 20.2031-2(b).
2 1959-1 C.B. 237.
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(b) The economic outlook in general and the condition and outlook
of the industry in particular.
(c) The book value of the stock.
(d) The company's earning capacity.
(e) The company's dividend paying capacity.
(f) Good will and other intangible values.
(g) The relative size of the block of stock to be valued.
(h) Sales of similar stocks.
It goes without saying that this list is not all-inclusive. The capitalization
method of valuation is frequently employed in valuing these securities.
Its use will of course be determined by the facts.
A more detailed discussion of the problems inherent in the valuation
of closely held securities is beyond the scope of this article. The prac-
titioner who is not experienced in this area and who does not consider
himself an expert in the principles of valuation is well advised to seek
assistance from professional appraisers.
G. Life Estates and Remainders
The Montana inheritance tax law provides that, if requested by the
district judge, or the State Board of Equalization, the Montana Commis-
sioner of Insurance will determine the value of life estates and remainders.
His certificate is presumptive evidence that the method of computation
adopted therein is correct.2 42 However, every practitioner should want
to have at least an approximate idea of what this value will be before he
files his petition for the determination of the inheritance tax with the
district court.
Most states determine the value of life estates and remainders by
use of mortality tables. Montana is no exception, and the American Ex-
perience Table With Interest at Five Percent 243 is in use in this state.244
2
"R.C.M.1947, Sec. 91-4431.
24 AMERICAN EXPERIENCE TABLE WITH INTEREST AT 5 PERCENT WITH
CRAIG'S EXTENSION BELOW AGE 10.
Annuity or Present Value of $:
Due at the End of Each Year Dur
ing the Life of A Person of Speci
AGE fic Age.
0 ................................................ 12.818
1 ................................................ 14.922
2 .............................................. 15.731
3 .................-........................  16.125
4 .................-.............................. 16.346
5 ..................---------- .---------- -- 16.472
6 ................................................ 16 535
7 ............................................... 16 561
8 ................. ................ 16.560
9 ................................................ 16.540
10---- .......................... .... 16 50475
11 -------------------------------------------- 16.46076
12---- ......................... .................. 16 41469
13 ............................................... 16.36642
14 --_------_----- ..-------------------- 16.31581
15 -------------------........................ 16.26274
L Annuity or Present Value of $1
Due at the End of Each Year Dur-
ing the Life of A Person of Speci-
AGE fic Age.
16 ................................... 16.20722
17 -------_-----_- .......---------------------- 16.14896
18 ..................................... 16.08779
19 -------------------------------------------- 16.02372
20 ................................... 15.95658
21 ------ _---.............................. 15.88620
22__-.-------------............................ 15.81257
23 .................................... 15.73552
24 ................................................ 15.65484
25 ................................... 15.57033
26 .... 1.......................................... J 5.48176
27 ......................................... 15.38910
28 --------------............................... 15.29210
29 .................................. 15.19051
30 ............................................... 15.08425
31 ................................................ 14.97307
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It is relatively simple to use. For example, assume A, age 50, receives
property with a present value of $10,000 for life, with remainder over to
B. The value of A's life estate is $5,830.88; B's remainder is worth
$4,169.12, computed as follows:
Annual income = $500 ($10,000 X 5%).
Value of A's life estate = $5,830.88 ($500 X factor of 11.66175 from
table).
Value of B's remainder = $4,169.12 ($10,000 - $5,830.88, value of
A's life estate).
Of course, few persons, including life tenants, die in accordance
with mortality table calculations. If a life tenant should die substantially
prior to the time predetermined by the table, his estate may be entitled
to a refund for excess inheritance taxes paid.245 Of course, the early
demise of a life tenant would increase the value of the remainder and the
remainderman would then be expected to pay an additional tax com-
mensurate with that being returned to the estate of the life tenant.
32 ........................................... 14.85666 64 .............. .. . ..... 7.75900
33 ........................................... 14 73492 65 ............................................. 7.45885
34 ............. ...... 14.60774 66-................................................... 7.15921
35 ..... ........ ......... 14.47479 67 .................................................... 6.86074
36 ................................................ 14 33572 68 ........................................... 6.56420
37 ...................... 14.19057 69 ....................................................... 6.27048
38 .............................................. 14 03897 70 .. ...................... 5.98022
39 ................................................ 13 88092 71 ......................................... 5.69422
40 ............................................... 13 71604 72 ........................................... 5.41286
41 ................................................ 13 54430 73 .......................................... 5.13592
42 ................................................ 13 36528 74 ........................................... 4.86279
43 ........ ...................... 13.17891 75 ........................................................ 4.59264
44 .............................................. 12 98494 76 .................... ........ 4.32477
45 ...................... 12.78344 77 ..................................................... 4.05856
46 -----------------...... ... ........ 12.57414 78 .............................. 3.79392
47 ............................................ 12.35728 79 .. .. ..................... 3.53109
48 ....--.................. 12.13275 80 .......................................... 3.27017
49 ................................................ 11 90076 81 ........................................... 3.01349
50 ................................................ 11 66175 82 ............................................ 2.76062
51 ................................................ 11 41594 83  .................. ...................... 2.51052
52 ............................................... 11 16361 84 . . .. .. .. ..................... 2.26066
53 -----------------.............................. 10 90499 85 ............................................ 2.00986
54 .......................................... 10.64036 86 ........................ 1.76061
55 ...................... 10.37017 87 ....................................................... 1.51750
56 ................................................ 10 09472 88 ................... 1.28611
57 ....................... 9.81450 89 ------------ .......... .................. 1.06704
58 .................................... 9 52988 90 ........................................................ 0.85453
59 ------------_--............................... 9 24127 91 ................................................... 0.64497
60 ................................................ 8 94928 92 ................... 0.44851
61 ................................................ 8 65445 93 . . .. . ................. 0.28761
62 ............................................... 8 35742 94 ............................................. 0.1365
63.... ......................................... 8.05876
When successive life estates are involved, the computation becomes exceed-
ingly complex. To insure accuracy, it is suggested that the practitioner co-ordinate
his computations with the Inheritance Tax Division of the State Board of Equali-
zation.
"R.C.M.1947, See. 91-4432.
R.C.M.1947, See. 91-4433 provides, inter alia for the return of taxes paid when a life
estate has been defeated or abridged.
1970]
47
Wold: The Montana Death Taxes
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1969
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
THE MONTANA ESTATE TAX
A. Historical Basis
There are only two basic types of death taxes imposed in the United
States. The most common form is the inheritance tax which is utilized in
37 states and the District of Columbia. In theory, the inheritance tax
is levied on the respective shares each beneficiary receives from the
estate. The second form of death taxation is the estate tax which is
imposed by 8 states2 46 and the federal government. The estate tax is
levied against the decedent's estate before any distribution is made. Only
one state, Rhode Island, imposes both an estate and an inheritance tax and
only Nevada levies no death tax at all. 247
Most states which impose an inheritance tax also impose an additional
"pick up" tax, which is labeled as an estate tax. Montana's "estate"
tax, section 91-4411, R.C.M. 1947, is a "pick up" tax. It is not a true
estate tax, but is instead intended to take advantage of the maximum
federal credit for death taxes paid to the state. This "pick up" or
"estate" tax can only be understood in light of the history of the evolution
of the federal estate death tax credit.
The federal estate tax was originally enacted in 1916. This tax
was particularly disturbing to many states which clamored for the federal
government to withdraw from the field of death taxation. Consequently,
the United States Revenue Act of 1924 made provision for a credit of
up to 25 percent of the federal tax for death taxes paid to the states.
Unsatisfied, the states persisted in their demands for total federal with-
drawal. To appease these demands, the United States Revenue Act of
1926 increased the state death tax credit to 80 percent of the federal tax.
Under the 1926 act, the taxpayers who had a $1,000 federal estate tax
liability could deduct 80 percent of the tax, i.e., $800, and pay that
amount to the state, provided that the state imposed a death tax under
which it could accept such payment. To take advantage of this provision,
most states, including Montana, enacted "pick up" taxes which simply
imposed a tax equal to the difference between the amount due under the
state's inheritance tax and the amount representing 80 percent of the
federal estate tax. Thus, if a decedent's gross federal estate tax was $1,000
'"States imposing an estate tax are Arizona, Mississippi, New York, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina and Utah. Legislative research commissions
in Kentucky and Indiana have recommended adoption of an estate tax to replace
the inheritance tax presently in use in those states. These recommendations were
made in 1961 and 1966 respectively.
"'7Article 10, see. I of the Nevada Constitution prohibits the Nevada legislature from
imposing any estate or inheritance tax.
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and Montana's inheritance tax was only $650, the additional estate tax
picked up the additional $150. The computation was as follows:
Gross federal estate tax .................................................................... $1,000
80% credit ........................................................................... $800
Montana inheritance tax .................................................. 650
M ontana "estate" tax ........................................................ $150
Total tax paid to M ontana .......................................................... $800
Total tax paid to United States .................................................. $200
This system worked well, especially for the states. The states found
it especially easy to administer. However, in 1932 the federal govern-
ment found it necessary to augment the country's revenues and it was
decided to raise a substantial amount of these revenues by means of the
estate tax. The state tax credit presented a considerable problem, how-
ever, for if the rates were simply increased, most of the revenues would
pass to the states. Consequently, the federal tax structure was revised
so that the state tax credit was computed on the basis of the taxable
estate rather than as a percentage of the gross estate tax. The result
of this revision was that the relative positions of the states and the
federal government almost reversed themselves. Today the states now
collect about 20 percent of the total death taxes, whereas, the federal
government collects 80 percent.
B. Validity of Section 91-4411
Unfortunately, the Montana "pick up" or "estate" tax failed to
keep pace with the evolution of the federal estate tax. Until 1969 the
Montana estate tax remained in its original form. Originally enacted
in 1933, section 91-4411 was the typical state "pick up" tax, providing
that:
In addition to the taxes hereinabove imposed (by the inheritance
tax) an estate tax is hereby imposed upon the transfer of all estates
which are subject to an estate tax under the provisions of the United
States Revenue Act of 1926, and amendments thereto.... The amount
of said estate tax shall be equal to the extent, if any, of the excess
of the credit not exceeding eighty percent (80%) allowable under
said United States Revenue Act, over the aggregate amount of all
estates, inheritances, transfer, legacy and succession taxes paid to
any state or territory or the District of Columbia. ...
Thus, between 1933 and 1969, Montana has imposed an estate tax
under this section. Evidently, it was never realized that the 1926 Revenue
Act was repealed in 1939.248 This is significant since by the wording of
section 91-4411, only those estates which are subject to the 1926 act or
amendments thereto, are subject to the tax imposed by section 91-4411.
Since no estates have been subject to the 1926 act since its repeal in
1939, it could be concluded that any taxes levied since 1939 under section
91-4411 were improperly collected.
'"Act of February 10, 1939, 53 Stat. 1 (1939).
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In 1945, in Edenborn v. Flornoy,249 the Louisiana "pick up" tax
was unsuccessfully attacked on this basis. In pertinent part, the Louisiana
statute was identical to section 91-4411, i.e., the tax was imposed upon
''all estates which are subject to taxation under the Federal Revenue Act
of 1926. '"250 The Louisiana Supreme Court held that the statute should be
construed liberally to obtain its purpose and found that substantially
the same language of the 1926 Statute was carried over in the 1939 Internal
Revenue Code. Thus, despite the fact that the 1926 Act had been repealed,
the estate was subject to the tax.
Edenborn v. Flornoy was decided in 1945. In 1954 a new Internal
Revenue Code was enacted which repealed the 1939 Internal Revenue Code
relied upon in that case. The 1954 Code resulted in major changes designed
to simplify terminology and modes of computation. Consequently, it is
unknown whether the rationale of the Edenborn case would be applicable
today.
The anachronistic reference by section 91-4411 to the 1926 Act was
brought to the attention of the 1969 Montana Legislature which, by un-
animous consent of both houses, deleted all reference to that act substituting
therefore the words "Internal Revenue Code of 1954. "251 The amendment
was effective upon its approval by the Governor on March 14, 1969.
It is submitted that the amendment is probably a satisfactory stop-
gap measure which will preclude a successful future attack on the tax.
Yet to be resolved is whether section 91-4411 was invalid during the 30
years between the repeal of the 1926 Act in 1939 and the 1969 amendment
of section 91-4411.252 Certainly the taxpayer has nothing to gain by
challenging the act and suing for a refund of the tax paid to the state.
He pays the same amount of gross tax regardless of the act's validity. If
he was successful, the amount recovered from the state would simply be
disallowed as a federal tax credit and would have to be paid over to
the federal government. There is no question of double taxation. If any
amount of state loyalty can be attributed to a taxpayer, he probably would
rather have his tax payments received by the state government which is
closer to home than the federal government.
The federal government is the only party which has any incentive
for attacking the validity of section 91-4411 in its pre-1969 form. The
taxes paid to Montana under that section could be disallowed as a state
19209 La. 174, 24 So.2d 368 (1945).
°Sec. 1, Act No. 119 of 1932, Dart's Statutes, 58581.
"'Introduced as HB 608; enacted as Laws of Montana 1969, Ch. 360, sec. 1, effective
March 14, 1969.
"'No reported cases have been found which have dealt with this problem since the
enactment of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code. However, in May 1969, a suit was
filed in the Montana District Court in Cascade County by the Estate of Stella Mc-
Laughlin for the purpose of contesting the validity of section 91-4411. The basis of
the suit is that since no estates are currently subject to taxation under the 1926
Revenue Act, and since such characteristic appears to be the operative provision of
section 91-4411, that consequently no estates are subject to taxation under section
91-4411. The case had not been heard as of June, 1969. - : ....
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tax credit. However' there are several reasons why the federal government
would not be anxious to contest the act's validity. First, the federal
government's claim would have to be against the taxpayer, since there is
no "privity" as such between the federal and state governments in regard
to the amount of tax owed by the taxpayer. The taxpayer in turn would
have to recover from the state. This seems to be a lot of trouble for
the federal government to go to in order to recover a relatively small
amount. Second, it would require a disproportionate amount of research
on the part of the federal government to ferret out those few Montana
estates which paid any tax under section 91-4411. Third, empirically,
the federal government has adopted a relatively lax approach in regard
to the validity of state taxes. There is something inherently unfair about
the big guy offering the little guy a piece of candy and then taking it
back just because the little guy could not unwrap it.
C. Other Problems with the Montana "Estate" Tax
Aside from the question of the validity of section 91-4411, other
substantial problems exist in the application of that section. As dis-
cussed above, the tax is not a true estate tax, but instead is a "pick up"
tax. A major problem arises, however, in determining the amount to be
"picked up." This computation was simple to determine while the 1926 Act
was viable. It was simply the difference between 80 percent of the total
federal estate tax and the amount levied by the Montana inheritance tax.
However, the language directing the determination of the amount of the tax
was not changed either when the 1926 Act was repealed nor when section
91-4411 was amended in 1969. As a result, the present section is pieced
together with parts that do not interrelate. After the 1969 amendment
the language of section 91-4411 makes it appear that the Montana estate
tax is equal to 80 percent of the tax imposed by the federal government
less the amount of the Montana inheritance tax due. If so, the Montana
estate tax has lost its character as a "pick up" tax. This is because the
federal estate tax credit is no longer computed as it was in 1926, i.e.,
by simply allowing a credit equal to 80 percent of the gross federal estate
tax. Instead, it is computed by applying predetermined rates against
the taxable estate, which rate varies according to the size of the taxable
estate. To illustrate, if a Montana resident bequeathed a taxable estate
of $5,000,000 to his wife, the state tax credit allowable on his federal estate
tax return would be $398,320; his Montana inheritance tax would be
$396,100; the difference would be $2,200. Is this the amount of the Mon-
tana "estate" tax? The amended statute provides that the amount of
,tax is equal to "the excess of the credit of not exceeding eighty percenkt
(80%) allowable under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 over the ag-
gregate amount (of the Montana inheritance tax)" (emphasis added).
It is submitted that the language of the statute as it currently exists is
unintelligible, unless the italcized words are deleted. If this is done,
it becomes readily apparent that the "estate" tax is a "pick up" tax equal
to the difference between the federal estate tax credit and the Montana
inheritance tax.
1970]
51
Wold: The Montana Death Taxes
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1969
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
It is submitted that the next session of the Montana Legislature
should strike the words "of not exceeding eighty percent (80%)" from
section 91-4411. This phrase was viable when that section was based
on the 1926 Revenue Act, but it is only a confusing bit of verbiage today.
Besides the problem of ascertaining the amount of tax imposed by
section 91-4411, other problems exist with that section. For example,
there is a conflict between subsection (d) of section 91-4411 and section
91-4415. The former states that the estate tax "shall be, and remain a
lien on the property subject to the tax until the same are paid" (emphasis
added) whereas section 91-4415 provides that the lien shall exist "for a
period of ten years" (emphasis in original statute) unless sooner paid.
Another problem which may be overlooked by the practitioner is the
date that the estate tax is due. Section 91-4411(b) provides that the tax
is due at the same time the federal estate tax is due. Section 6075(a) of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides that the federal estate tax is
due 15 months from the date of death. Most practitioners are no doubt
aware of and try to take advantage of the provisions of section 91-4416
which permit a 5 percent discount on the inheritance tax if such tax is
paid within 18 months of death. However, the practitioner who con-
scientiously insures that the inheritance tax is paid on the 18th month
may be surprised to find that he is three months late in paying the Mon-
tana estate tax, and that the estate is subject to an interest penalty rather
than a discount.
D. Conclusion
The Montana "estate" tax is not an estate tax at all, but is in
reality a "pick up" tax which is designed to capture the maximum amount
allowed by the federal government as a state death tax credit. In theory,
the idea is fine. In practice, the tax is probably seldom applied. The
smallest estates to which it can possibly apply are those whose taxable
estate, i.e., after deductions, are approximately five million dollars, and
only then if the entire amount was left to beneficiaries in the most pre-
ferred tax bracket such as the wife or children. Consequently, it is
doubtful that the tax is being applied in very many Montana estates.
Unfortunately, no statistics have been compiled with which to determine
the frequency of its application.
CONCLUSION
Throughout this paper various conclusions and recommendations have
been made. It appeared to be more logical to draw those conclusions and
make those recommendations at the time the facts supporting them were
under discussion rather than to reserve them for the final chapter. Ac-
cordingly and because of the length of this paper, no conclusions as to
specific sections of the existing death taxes will be made here.
Instead, however, some general ruminations and evaluations appear
to be in order. It appears that the Montana death tax structure, like
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most tax structures, is like an old house which through the years has
been partially torn down, partly rebuilt, and patched on not infrequent
occasions. Some rooms of the house are modern, but the decor of many
others is in sad need of remodeling. The time is fast approaching when
the Montana Legislature, like the owner of the old house, must decide
whether to raze the structure and build anew, or continue to suffer its
antiquity.
Fortunately, for the owner of the house, he has certain tangible
guidelines upon which to base his decision. Unfortunately, for the Mon-
tana Legislature, no such obvious guidelines exist for no study has ever
been made of this tax structure. Perhaps the major point of this paper
has been to point out the need for such a study.
When and if this study is made, serious consideration should be
given to determining whether Montana should abolish its inheritance tax
and enact a pure estate tax. It has proven impossible to devote a separate
chapter to this possibility simply because of the lack of information with
which to adequately evaluate the existing death tax. However, an estate
tax has sufficient enticing features that it warrants some comment at this
point. The primary advantage of an estate tax is its simplicity of ad-
ministration in comparison to the inheritance tax. Under an estate tax,
once the net taxable estate has been determined, it is only necessary to
apply the successive rates to that figure in order to determine the tax
due. In most cases, this relieves the administrators, executors, attorneys,
courts, and the State Board of Equalization from construing wills and
determining the rights of individual beneficiaries in order to deter-
mine the tax. It would no longer be necessary to labor over computation
of contingent interests. Sizeable estates frequently involve at least one
and possibly multiple life estates and remainders. Montana, like most
states, requires that each such interest be valued and this seldom results in
accurate appraisals. As noted earlier, if a life estate is cut short the life
tenant or his estate has the right to claim a refund. Thus, just because an
estate has been closed does not necessarily mean that problems will not
arise again. Further, collection of the inheritance tax may be delayed for
long periods of time while the estate is being valued or if the valuation
is contested. These types of problems are not apt to arise as frequently,
if at all, with an estate tax.
South Carolina adopted an estate tax in 1961. Prior to that time
it was estimated that in about 45% of the estates administered in that
state a will was probated and about 60% of those wills provided for a
future interest. After the adoption of an estate tax and a $60,000
exemption, the Director of the South Carolina Estate Tax Division re-
ported that:
The administrative cost, due to the tremendous decrease in returns
of a nonrevenue producing nature that were formerly processed,
has been minimized to a point of insignificance. Through an ef-
fective selective audit program with the federal government by
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means of interchange of audit reports, deficiency collections have
more than doubled with no increase in our present audit staff ...
The estate tax is an administrator's tax in every respect.253
Montana evidently experiences much the same problems as did South
Carolina in having to process a large number of nonproductive returns.
As seen earlier, approximately one-half of all inheritance tax returns filed
in Montana do not produce a cent of revenue. 254 Further, it appears
that about two-thirds of the estates taxed are valued at less than $60,000.25
Because of the lack of information on this point, these figures of necessity
have been derived in a round-about manner. However, in the absence
of countervailing indications it must be concluded that most of Mon-
tana's death taxes are paid by only about one-third of the estates taxed,
or about one-fifth of the total estates processed. If so, too much time is
wasted in processing nonproductive estates. The system which requires
this waste is defective and in need either of overhaul or replacement.
The adoption of an estate tax with a definition of gross estate and
an exemption equal to that of the federal estate tax would have other
significant advantages. For example, there should be an important decrease
in enforcement costs and at the same time enforcement efficiency should
be increased. This should result, at least in part, from the state's being
able to take advantage of the comprehensive federal tax audit system.
Further, the state could rely, at least in part, on the federal estate tax
regulations as a means of interpreting the state tax laws. Also, the
extensive body of case law dealing with the federal estate tax would be
applicable.
Adoption of an estate tax would also benefit the taxpayers. Once
the federal return is completed the information can simply be transferred
to a similar state tax form as is done with Montana's income tax. The
more closely the state tax corresponds to the federal base the greater
becomes this advantage. Further, the practitioner would no doubt like
to have some reference work upon which to rely when planning estates.
Montana 'presently has no death tax regulations, nor does it promulgate
the administrative decisions of the State Board of Equalization. If an
estate tax was adopted, it would be much simpler to adopt such regulations
and interpretative guides than if they had to be written from scratch as
would be the case if the inheritance tax is continued.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to propose in detail the specific
provisions of an estate tax that might be best for this state. Indeed,
until it is determined whether the inheritance tax has outlived its
function such proposals would be premature. Suffice it to say that
if the decision is ever made to institute an estate tax in this state,
""Letter from Lovick N. Hornsby, Director, Estate Tax Division, South Carolina Tax
Commission, to the Indiana Commission on State Tax and Financing Policy, July 6,
1966, as cited in "Death Taxation,'' Indiana Commission on State Tax and Financing
Policy, 1966, pp. 37-38.
M4See Table 7, Appendix.
215See Table 8, Appendix.
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reference should be made to the statutes being postulated or promulgated
by the increasing number of states which are contemplating or adopting
this form of death taxation.
APPENDIX
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE MONTANA DEATH TAXES
It appears that this is the first attempt to analyze the Montana death taxes
from a statistical point of view. From time to time, the Montana Legislative
Council causes studies to be made of various Montana tax structures", but so far
the Montana death taxes have escaped scrutiny. This is not surprising in light
of the paucity of available statistics with which to conduct such a study. The
statistics utilized in this analysis, except where otherwise indicated, were gleaned
from the records of the inheritance tax division of the Montana Board of Equali-
zation. They were obtained without the aid of electronic data processing equipment
since such equipment has not yet been made available to that department.
It is unfortunate that modern means of data compilation are not available
with which to gather information about the Montana death taxes. Death taxes
have consistently been a steady and important source of the state's total tax
revenue. As indicated by Table 1, the inheritance and estate taxes have ac-
counted for 5.2 percent of the state's total tax receipts over a 13-year period.
For a 10-year period following 1959, the Montana death tax collections experi-
enced a growth rate roughly equivalent to the increase in gross tax receipts, as
evidenced by Chart 1.
TABLE 1
MONTANA DEATH TAX COLLECTIONS AS PERCENT
OF TOTAL STATE TAX REVENUE, 1956-1968
YEAR TOTAL GENERAL' TOTAL DEATH PERCENTAGE
FUND REVENUE TAX COLLECTIONS OF TOTAL
(Thousands) (Thousands) REVENUE
1956 ---------------------------- 25,223 1,471 5.8%
1957 ............................ 28,875 1,341 4.6%
1958 ............................ 31,382 1,692 5.3%
1959 ............................ 34,761 2,098 6.0%
1960 ---------------------------- 38,089 1,878 4.9%
1961 -...........-............. 39,358 1,992 5.0%
1962 ..........----------------- 42,102 2,186 5.1%
t963 ............................ 42,162 2,094 4.9%
1964 ........................... 45,458 2,404 5.2%
1965 ............................ 48,701 2,600 5.3%
1966 ........................... 51,548 2,833 5.4%
1967 ........................... 57,829 2,865 4.9%
1968 --------------.----------- 62,644 3,078 4.9%
Thirteen years ------ 548,132 28,529 5.2%
1 Source: Montana Executive Budget Reports, 1967-1969, 1969-1971.
'
6 The most recent published study is the 'Montana Taxation Task Force Papers"
(1966).
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The relative importance of death taxes as a source of Montana revenue is
further evidenced by Table 2 which compares 1968 death tax collections with the
actual expenditures of selected vital governmental agencies during the same year.
TABLE 2
COMPARISON OF 1968 MONTANA DEATH TAX COLLECTIONS WITH
ACTUAL EXPENDITURES OF SELECTED STATE AGENCIES 1968
Death tax collections, 1968 ................................................................................ $3,078,477
Expenditures, Selected agencies, 1968:
Elected Officials ............................................................................................ $1,139,100
Includes: Attorney General, Auditor, Governor, Railroad Com-
missioners, Secretary of State, Supreme Court, Treasurer.
General Governm ent .................................................................................... $3,082,894
Includes: Department of Administration, County Attorneys,
Office of Economic Opportunity, Board of Equalization, Board
of Examiners, Historical Society, Coordinator of Indian Affairs,
District Judges, Department of Labor and Industry, Lands and
Investments, Law Library, Library Commission, Board of Par-
dons, Department of Planning and Economic Development.
Agriculture and Natural Resources ------------------------------------------------------ $3,040,070
Includes: Department of Agriculture, State Entomologist, Fish
and Game Commission, State Forester, Livestock Commission,
Livestock Sanitary Board, Council of Natural Resources and
Development, Soil Conservation Committee, Water Resources
Board.
Public Safety .............. $................................................................................ $2,810,000
Includes: Adjutant General, Civil Defense, Highway Patrol.
Thus, it may be concluded that while the Montana death taxes are not a major
source of revenue in the sense that they do not contribute a large percentage of
the gross receipts, they are an important source for two reasons. First, the amount
collected is significant. Second, it is a stable source with a growth rate com-
parable to that of the gross tax receipts.
When compared with all other states, death taxes play a more important
role in Montana's economy than in all but two other states. Table 3 shows that
Montana is surpassed only by Connecticut and New Jersey in the ratio of death
taxes to all other forms of state revenue.
TABLE 3
ALL STATE COMPARISON OF DEATH TAX AS SOURCE
OF TOTAL STATE TAX REVENUES, 1968
STATE TOTAL TAX DEATH AND GIFT TAX PERCENTAGE
REVENUE, 1968 COLLECTIONS, 1968 OF TOTAL
(Thousands) (Thousands) REVENUE
Alabama ----------------- 531,662 1,368 .2%
Alaska ....................... _ 60,402 170 .2%
Arizona ...................... 315,916 2,323 .7%
Arkansas ------------------- 289,644 701 .2%
California .................. 4,663,369 142,651 3.0%
Colorado ......---------- 361,251 10,586 2.9%
Connecticut --------------- 499,826 38,347 7.6%
Delaware .................. _144,789 6,013 4.1%
Florida ----------------------- 973,130 13,360 1.3%
Georgia --------------------- 737,181 5,701 .7%
Hawaii ----------------------- 242,655 1,606 .6%
Idaho .......................... 136,788 1,283 .9%
Illinois ------------------------ 1,730,634 44,583 2.5%
Indiana ..............------- 819,152 21,205 2.5%
Iowa ............................ 502,453 15,102 3.0%
Kansas ........................ 357,045 7,501 2.1%
Kentucky ------------------- 509,316 9,507 1.8%
Louisiana .................... 740,436 6,565 .8%
Maine .......................... 146,145 4,667 3.1%
Maryland ------------------- 771,368 7,455 .9%
Massachusetts ------- 1,033,363 38,301 3.7%
Michigan ------------------- 1,885,629 25,032 1.3%
Minnesota ----------------- 815,122 18,392 2.2%
Mississippi .................. 322,520 1,459 .4%
Missouri ...................... 656,967 11,650 1.7%
Montana .................... 62,644 3,078 4.9% 57
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Nebraska .................... 193,977 1,343 .6%
Nevada .................... 103,528 N/A
New Hampshire ...... 75,261 3,656 4.8%
New Jersey ................ 953,954 55,358 5.8%
New Mexico .............. 217,137 1,298 .5%
New York .................. 4,447,165 119,695 2.6%
North Carolina ........ 900,150 15,033 1.6%
North Dakota ............ 101,456 677 .6%
Ohio ............................ 1,370,216 17,743 1.2%
Oklahoma .................. 427,502 12,986 3.0%
Oregon ....................... 324,797 10,088 3.1%
Pennsylvania ............ 2,003,580 76,023 3.7%
Rhode Island ............ 166,653 6,814 4.0%
South Carolina ........ 412,398 3,782 .9%
South Dakota .......... 87,873 1,530 1.7%
Tennessee .................. 577,320 12,197 2.1%
Texas .......................... 1,437,971 24,025 1.6%
Utah ............................ 183,510 2,281 1.2%
Vermont .................... 88,172 2,324 2.6%
Virginia ...................... 731,674 10,673 1.4%
Washington ................ 878,644 22,159 2.5%
West Virginia .......... 320,576 5,040 1.5%
Wisconsin .................. 990,548 28,250 2.8%
Wyoming .................... 68,671 643 .9%
All States ...... ... 36,268,2811 872,224 2.4%
Source: U.S. Bureau of The Census, State Tax Collections in 1968, Series GF68-No. 1.
'Excluding Nevada which imposes no Death Tax.
In 1968, death taxes represented 4.9 percent of Montana's total tax receipts
while the average for all states during that same period was only 2.4 percent. A
geographical breakdown shows that Montana relies more heavily on its death
taxes as a source of revenue than do its neighboring states.
TABLE 4
DEATH AND GIFT TAXES AS A PERCENT OF GROSS
TAX RECEIPTS, SELECTED STATES, 1968
STATE PERCENTAGE OF GROSS
TAX RECEIPTS
M ontana ........................................................................................ 4.9%
O regon ......................................................................................... 3.1%
Colorado ........................................................................................ 2.9%
W ashington .................................................................................. 2.5%
South Dakota .............................................................................. 1.7%
W yoming ...................................................................................... .9%
Idaho .............................................................................................. .9%
N orth Dakota ............................................................................. . 6%
One reason that death taxes play a larger role in Montana's economy than
in most other states is because Montana has a small population with relatively
little industry. Consequently, there is not as much concentration of capital and
there are also fewer opportunities to levy taxes. Thus, it is possible that Mon-
tana's death tax structure, if imposed in another state, would produce proportion-
ately less income in a more populous and more heavily industrialized state.
However, one reason that the amount of income generated by Montana's death
taxes is proportionately greater than that generated by states with similar popu-
lation density is that Montana's death tax rates are simply higher. In fact, Mon-
tana's death taxes are among the highest in the Nation, as is evidenced by
Table 5. 58
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It is apparent from Table 6 that the total tax collected, the total number
of estates paying tax, and the average tax paid per estate taxed have all enjoyed
a steady rate of growth. The 1968 figures are well in excess of the ten-year
averages.
TABLE 6
AVERAGE MONTANA INHERITANCE TAXES
YEAR TOTAL MONTANA NUMBER OF
INHERITANCE ESTATES IN
TAX PAID WHICH TAX
(Thousands) PAID
1959 .................................... $2,089 1755
1960 .................................... $1,878 1767
1961 _---_------------------------ $1,992 1829
1962 -------------------------------- $2,186 1805
1963 -----------........................ $2,094 1923
1964 .................................... $2,404 2154
1965 .................................... $2,600 2078
1966 .................................... $2,833 2150
1967 -----------......................... $2,865 2031
1968 .................................... $3,078 1988
Ten-Year Averages ........ $2,402 1948
PAID, 1959-1968
AVERAGE TAX
PAID PER TAXED
ESTATE
$1,190
$1,062
$1,089
$1,211
$1,089
$1,116
$1,251
$1,317
$1,410
$1,548
$1,233
In Montana, the State Board of Equalization must certify the amount of
tax due in each estate administered or probated. In many cases, no tax will be due
but a certificate must nonetheless be issued to that effect. Table 7 shows that over
a ten-year period, only about one-half of the estates requiring certification were
taxable estates.
TABLE 7
NUMBER OF ESTATES IN WHICH NO DEATH
TAXES WERE PAID, 1959-1968
TOTAL NUMBER OF ESTATES P
CERTIFICATES IN WHICH NO TAX 01
ISSUED DUE WI
3416
3414
3460
3494
3590
3604
3880
3808
4027
3986
Ten-Year Totals ............ 36679
Ten-Year Averages ........ 3667
1661
1647
1631
1689
1667
1450
1802
1658
1996
1998
17199
1720
Further analysis of the information contained in Tables 6 and 7 reveals that
while Montana's population increased only 3.7% between 1960 and 1968 inclusive,
the total amount of tax collected has increased 38.9%. This is accounted for by
an 11.1% increase in the number of estates paying tax and a 30.2% increase in
the amount of tax paid per estate. If any valid conclusions can be drawn
from these figures, it is that the size of the estates subject to the Montana
death taxes has increased considerably more than the population increase and
that while there is a slight increase in the number of taxable estates, the tax paid
per estate has increased at a faster rate. If these conclusions are valid, it must
be further concluded that the persons dying today are wealthier than those who
died ten years ago. This may not be surprising in light of the fact that Mon-
tana has been a state for only about one generation. Many of the persons dying
today and in the past ten years are those who acquired vast land holdings in
the early years of statehood and whose holdings have substantially appreciated.
It is unfortunate that statistics have not been compiled which would show the
size of the estates which have been probated. If such information was available,
a far more conclusive analysis could be made. Serious thought should be given
YEAR
1959
1960 -
1961 -
1962
1963 -
1964 -
1965 -
1966 -
1967 -
1968 .
ERCENTAGE
F ESTATE INSICH NO TAX
DUE
48.6%
48.2%
47.1%
48.3%
46.4%
40.2%
46.4%
43.5%
49.5%
50.1%
46.8%
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to the acquisition of such data, for it is only by making such a study that the
propriety of the burden distribution can be determined. For example, it would be
helpful to know the ratio of large estates to small estates. Perhaps small estates
are contributing far more than their fair share to the total collections. Of course,
what is a fair share is a subject of legislative determination with sociological
overtones, but it is submitted that the problem cannot be adequately dealt with
without more information.
The only information discovered which casts light on the size of the estates
being taxed in Montana is information culled from the files of the federal internal
revenue office, which has supplied the number of federal estate tax returns filed
in Montana for a 10 year period beginning in 1959. Those figures are compared
with the number of estates filed in Montana in Table 8.
TABLE 8
NUMBER OF DEATH TAX RETURNS FILED IN MONTANA
STATE AND FEDERAL, 1959-1968
YEAR NUMBER OF NUMBER OF NUMBER OF
CERTIFICATES ESTATES IN FEDERAL
ISSUED WHICH TAX ESTATE TAX I
OWED RETURNS FILED
1959 ........................................ 3416 1755 323
1960 ........................................ 3414 1767 334
1961 ........................................ 3460 1829 402
1962 ........................................ 3494 1805 340
1963 ........................................ 3590 1923 474
1964 ........................................ 3604 2154 474
1965 ........................................ 3880 2078 551
1966 ........................................ 3808 2150 518
1967 .................................... 4027 2031 581
1968 ........................................ 3986 1988 7002
1 Source: Compiled from records of Internal Revenue Service, Helena, Montana
Office.
2 Estimated.
From Table 8 it is seen that about five times as many estates paid the
state death tax as filed federal estate tax returns in 1959, whereas that ratio
steadily decreased over a 10 year period to the point where in 1968 it is estimated
that more than one-third of the estates which paid the Montana death taxes
also filed a federal estate tax return. Since no federal estate tax return is neces-
sary unless the estate exceeds $60,000, these figures provide the basis for at least
some tentative conclusions. First, the raw number of Montana estates valued
in excess of $60,000 has steadily increased approximately 53% over a 10 year
period. Second, if it can be assumed that the same estates filed both federal and
state tax returns in the same year, then in 1959 only 18.4% of those filing
Montana returns had an estate valued in excess of $60,000, and that this figure
has steadily increased to 24.6% in 1963 and approximately 35.2% in 1968. Con-
sequently, it would follow that the decedents whose estates were filed in 1968
were considerably wealthier than those whose estates were filed in 1959. In short it
appears that more large estates are being probated today than 10 years ago.
Analysis by County
A statistical analysis by county of the death taxes paid supports the con-
clusion drawn earlier that the increase in death tax collections could be at-
tributed, at least in part, to the death of large land holders. For example, Table
9 shows that the largest average taxes paid per estate are those probated in
the least populous counties.
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Table 9 shows that the largest average tax paid per estate is in Meagher
county which ranks 49th out of 56 counties in population. The most populous
county, Yellowstone, ranks 18th in average tax paid per estate. However, it
cannot be safely concluded that the per capita wealth of the populace of Meagher
county is greater than the per capita wealth of Yellowstone county, simply because
it is not safe to assume that the largest estates pay the most taxes. It is possible,
however unlikely, that Petroleum county is the wealthiest per capita, even though it
ranks 56th in average tax paid and 56th in population. Perhaps the decedents in
Petroleum county have received better estate planning advice than those dying
in Meagher county.
Consequently, Table 9 reflects interesting data, but it is hardly enough with
which to draw any meaningful conclusions. To accurately appraise the size of
estates administered or probated in each county would require information as to
the value of the gross estate, the deductions allowed, and the exemptions permitted.
Such information is necessary in order to appraise the burden distribution by
county.
Conclusions
From the foregoing tables and chart, the following conclusions can be
drawn:
1. The Montana death taxes play a small but important role as a revenue
producer, consistently accounting for about 5% of the state's gross tax receipts
(Table 1).
2. For the 10 years following 1959, the Montana death taxes have maintained
a growth rate roughly equal to that of the gross tax receipts (Chart 1). This
indicates that the tax is a stable revenue producer and that the amount of future
collections may be accurately forecast. It is not safe, however, to make long-range
forecasts until a more detailed study is made to determine whether the proceeds
of the large estates now being probated are remaining subject to the Montana tax
structure. For example, if relatively few decedents have devised a large portion
of Montana lands to nontaxable foundations, this land will henceforth be exempt
from taxation. This is a real possibility and should be investigated.
3. Although only about three million dollars is generated annually by the
Montana death taxes, this is an important sum in light of the fact that it is
sufficient to completely cover the expenditures of many vital governmental agen-
cies (Table 2).
4. Death taxes play a larger role in Montana's economy than in all but
two other states (Table 3). Since'most 'other states are more populous and have
a heavier concentration of capital, it is not recommended that the role of Mon-
tana's death taxes be de-emphasized solely for the reason of aligning them more
squarely with the role played by such taxes in most other states. However, the
fact that Montana's death taxes are among the highest in the Nation (Table 5)
may give some legislators cause to re-examine themu. Some legislators may not be
too concerned about the fact that Montana ranks fourth nationally in amount
of tax levied against a typical estate in excess of one million dollars. There
probably have not been very many estates of that size probated in Montana. But
the same legislator may pause to wonder whether the tax burden is evenly dis-
tributed when he learns that Montana ranks 6th among all states in taxing
small estates of $25,000.
5. The average tax paid per estate taxed in Montana has grown at a faster
rate than the number of estates taxed (Table 6). This might indicate that the
average estate has gotten larger, a possibility supported by the fact that the
number of federal tax returns has steadily increased over a ten-year period.
However, this may not be the case.- Perhaps, the average deductions have gotten
smaller as a percent of the gross estate, or fewer exemptions are being claimed.
A study should be made to determine the cause of the increased tax paid per
estate.
6. The number of estates processed in which no tax is paid has steadily
increased (Table 7). Consequently, it can be assumed that there has been either
(1) a corresponding increase in the time and number of personnel required to
process such estates, or (2) that less attention is being given to the processing
of taxable estates. Either alternative is undesirable. A study should be made to
determine whether it is possible to either reduce or eliminate the processing of
small estates which, produce no revenue for the state.
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7. Generally speaking, the largest tax paid per estate is paid in the counties
with the smallest population (Table 9). This may or may not indicate that de-
cedents in those counties are wealthier than decedents of more populous counties.
As would be expected, more death tax returns are filed in the most densely
populated counties.
It is unfortunate that no other conclusions can be drawn at this time. A
few other states, including California, Kentucky, Ohio, and Indiana have made
detailed studies of their death tax structure. Using these studies as a guideline,
those states have been able to meet what are probably the two primary objectives
of a state death tax: (1) from the taxpayer's viewpoint, to insure that the tax
is fair, i.e., that estates of differing sizes bear their fair share of the tax burden;
(2) from the state's viewpoint, to insure that the tax operates effectively as
a revenue producer. To date, Montana is unable to say with certainty that its
death tax structure satisfies either of these objectives.
It is recommended that Montana undertake a study of its death tax akin
to those made by other states. Such a study should attempt to answer the fol-
lowing questions, among others:
1. Number and value of taxable estates.
2. Number and percent of taxable estates by county and the size of the
total estate.
3. Amount of deductions allowed, according to size of taxable estates.
4. Amount of exemptions allowed, according to size of taxable estates.
5. Amount of charitable contributions made, according to size of taxable
estate.
6. Identity of beneficiaries by class.
7. Proportionate amount received by each class of beneficiaries.
With these figures as a starting point the Board of Equalization would be in
a position to evaluate the operation of the tax and make appropriate recommen-
dations for changes to the legislature.
The legislature should also be interested in insuring the efficient and ef-
fective administration of the tax. To this end, the following information should
be gathered:
1. Time interval from death to certification of tax due.
2. Time required to process nontaxable estates.
3. Cost of processing estates, resident and nonresident.
These lists are not intended to be all inclusive. Those charged with the
administration of the tax could no doubt increase it manyfold. The point, however,
is that there is a need for further study of this small but important tax structure.
The key to the study can be summed up in a word-funds. Without an appropriation
from the Legislature, the study can never be made. Without the study, the tax
will continue to be administered without a true awareness of what is being ac-
complished. No one will ever be certain until such a study is made whether the
tax is as fair or as efficient as it could and should be.
1970]
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